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ABSTRACT 
 
Most studies investigating the role of uncertainty in smallholder decision making have 
focused on either shocks or some notion of risk based on variability. When analyzing 
household production behavior, considering only yield variability ignores the potential 
effect of shocks on yield variability, and input allocation decisions. In this thesis, both 
shocks and yield risk are considered. We use a two-period expected utility model to 
analyze smallholder labor allocation sequentially. The data for this paper were 
obtained from a panel survey conducted in southern Ghana from 1996 to 1997. The 
approach used in this paper allows the incorporation of temporal uncertainty by 
introducing the concepts of ex ante and ex post yield risk which were briefly discussed 
by Sandmo (1970) and Holt et al. (1992). We find evidence of sequential dependence 
of labor decisions. Labor allocation in the planting period of the season helped explain 
labor allocation in the subsequent preharvest period of the season. Damage to stored 
crops in the planting period and negative health events experienced by the household 
during the second part of the previous season are important for ex post labor 
allocation. Household ex post labor allocation responds positively to ex post yield risk.  
Households shift labor to non-farm activities in response to ex post yield risk in order 
to smooth their incomes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Smallholder farm households in West Africa deal with uncertainty on two fronts: 
covariate and idiosyncratic risk. Covariate risk affects a whole community while 
idiosyncratic risk is peculiar to a particular household and does not significantly 
impact other households in the community.1
                                                 
1In this paper, idiosyncratic risk includes the possibility of experiencing idiosyncratic shocks. 
 Due to their diffuse temporal and spatial 
distribution, the incidence of idiosyncratic shocks typically does not attract attention 
from government and non-government organizations. Examples of idiosyncratic 
shocks include death of a household member, loss of employment, sickness, 
unexpected expenses, disease attack on crops, crop failure, and lower than expected 
sales receipts. In the absence of formal insurance or credit institutions, idiosyncratic 
shocks may have dire implications for smallholder households. Even though 
smallholder households may have strategies for managing risk, they remain vulnerable 
to poverty since the effectiveness of these strategies in insuring their assets against 
shocks is not known. In the case of smallholder farm households, their on-farm input 
allocation may be regarded as a reflection of their response to risk. This assertion is 
corroborated by past studies of consumption and production behavior of smallholder 
rural households, which have clearly established that most households respond to 
some form of risk (Behrman et al., 1997; Fafchamps, 1993; Kochar, 1999; Rose, 
1999; Udry and Duflo, 2004).                  
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 In most rural West African areas, the household head is the main income 
earner and in most cases has more than one occupation. Most on-farm input allocation 
decisions are made by the household head since he/she control the resources of the 
household. When a smallholder farm household experiences idiosyncratic shocks, it 
can lead to sub-optimal on-farm input allocation, resulting in low crop yields. These 
idiosyncratic shocks (both household-specific and plot-specific) can affect labor 
quality by diverting the attention of the household from critical crop production tasks 
during the season.  In addition, certain types of idiosyncratic shocks can directly or 
indirectly affect caloric intake which in turn affects the productivity of labor (Behrman 
et al., 1997).  
 Consequently, with the recurrence of idiosyncratic shocks the household can 
repeatedly experience low yields which can culminate in the household decreasing 
acreage and in extreme cases discontinuing crop production. In areas where there are 
limited employment opportunities, the recurrence of idiosyncratic shocks can put 
households in a quandary; they experience low crop yields due to idiosyncratic shocks, 
however, they are unable to completely shift from crop production due to limited 
opportunities. In this situation, households that repeatedly experience negative events 
that impact their agricultural productivity are unable to completely shift from crop 
production to another activity. In the long run this can result in some smallholder 
households becoming trapped in poverty and unable to recover from idiosyncratic 
shocks. For example, in the event of insect attacks, households whose sources of 
income are non-farm employment and crop production cannot easily shift from crop 
production to other non-farm activities. Hence, households have to make a difficult 
choice between maintaining the status quo and concentrating on non-farm activities.  
 In the past, many policies have been designed to help rural households cope 
with shocks, however, these policies have largely focused on covariate shocks and can 
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not effectively address the negative effects of idiosyncratic shocks. By gaining insight 
into smallholder on-farm input allocation behavior, both governmental and non-
governmental institutions can design better policies to specifically deal with the effects 
of idiosyncratic shocks and their associated risks on smallholder farm households. 
This paper aims to investigate the impact of idiosyncratic risk and shocks on 
household labor decisions. 
 In a study of labor supply in rural India, Rose (2001) established that 
smallholder households respond to risk both ex ante and ex post. When smallholder 
households make ex ante on-farm input allocation decisions, they are made in 
anticipation of the occurrence of shocks in the future and their knowledge of risk 
based on available information. In this paper, this form of temporal risk is termed “ex 
ante risk.”  Ex ante risk2
 After the realization of stochastic events and other information relevant to the 
production process, the household updates its decisions by incorporating the new 
information into its decision-making process. In this thesis, the risk that is revealed to 
the household after the realization of shocks will be termed "ex post risk”
 is based on the household’s subjective distribution of the 
outcome of an activity. In crop production, the household knows the subjective yield 
distribution through observation of yields over time and/or across different 
households. This makes the second moment of the subjective distribution of yield a 
good candidate for representing the riskiness of crop production.  
3
 There have been numerous studies on agricultural decisions under uncertainty. 
These studies can be divided into groups based on approaches which include: (i) those 
 since the 
household cannot determine it until new information becomes available. 
                                                 
2 The concept of ex ante risk or variability is briefly mentioned by Sandmo (1970). Refer to section 2.5 
of the literature review for a discussion of Sandmo’s work. 
3 The concept of ex post risk or variability is briefly mentioned by Sandmo (1970). Refer to section 2.5 
of the literature review for a discussion of Sandmo’s work. 
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that incorporate some measure of risk and risk aversion into the analysis of economic 
behavior under uncertainty in a single-period model (e.g., Chavas and Holt, 1996; 
Love and Buccola, 1991; Saha et al., 1994); (ii) those that analyze agricultural 
decisions taking into the stochastic and dynamic nature of agricultural production 
(e.g.,, Behrman et al., 1997; Fafchamps, 1993; Rose, 2000; Kochar, 1995, 1999; 
Skoufias, 1993); and (iii) those that analyze agricultural decision incorporating only 
the dynamic/sequential nature of agricultural production (e.g., Antle, 1983; Antle and 
Hathett, 1986).4
 The kind of response employed by households in response to idiosyncratic 
shocks has implications for the distribution of household incomes and therefore long 
term implications for wealth accumulation. Due to the possible risk-increasing effects 
of poor timing of on-farm labor allocation, failure of the household to respond 
appropriately to idiosyncratic shocks can increase the riskiness (variance) of crop 
production and eventually result in them engaging in other income generating 
activities which are less risky but have a lower return.  
 The above categorization is far from exhaustive but it gives us an idea 
of some of the approaches that have been used for analyzing production behavior. This 
thesis contributes to the current literature by analyzing labor allocation taking into 
account both the incidence of shocks and the dynamic nature of agricultural 
production while incorporating a measure of risk faced by decision makers. 
 One of the major decisions smallholder farm households make is on-farm labor 
allocation. During the season, households experience various types of shocks which 
include idiosyncratic shocks. As demonstrated by Fafchamps (1993) in his study of 
farmers in Burkina Faso, farmers respond to these shocks in their on-farm labor 
allocation. According to the study, farmers build flexibility into their farming practices 
which allows them to respond appropriately to shocks as they are revealed during the 
                                                 
4 These and other similar studies are thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2. 
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course of the season. The subjective yield distribution of the household is then a 
function of their on-farm input allocation decisions in response to those shocks. Since 
shocks are exogenous, one of the practical strategies for controlling yield risk is on-
farm input allocation before and after the realization of shocks.  
 There is strong empirical evidence in the applied risk analysis literature that 
most agricultural producers are risk averse. Saha et al. (1994) using farm-level wheat 
production data rejected the null hypothesis of risk neutrality in favor of risk aversion. 
Chavas and Holt (1996) in their study of corn-soybean acreage allocation decisions 
also confirmed the assumption of risk aversion among producers. In the context of risk 
aversion, the occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks can lead to attempts by the household 
to control risk using various risk management strategies. In the Akwapim South region 
of Ghana where the main source of livelihood is crop production, idiosyncratic shocks 
and risk elicit on-farm labor allocation behavior which can increase the riskiness of 
crop production due to increases in the variability of crop yield. This increase in 
variability can feed into households subjective yield distributions or perceptions of 
yield variability which has further implications for production efficiency and therefore 
farm income.  
 Smallholder farm households have many insurance strategies which include 
self-insurance in the form of liquid wealth. When households experience idiosyncratic 
shocks that impact their incomes, they employ one or a combination of strategies, 
including dissaving to smooth consumption, or reallocating their labor from farming to 
other activities. 
 In this thesis, I analyze smallholder household labor allocation ex ante and ex 
post. I focus on four issues. First, I explore the role played by self-insurance capacity 
(represented by wealth) of the household in their labor allocation. Does self-insurance 
capacity influence household labor allocation patterns? Assuming households are risk-
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averse, will poorer households allocate more labor to farming relative to their richer 
counterparts? Second, I analyze the ex ante and the ex post effects of risk and 
information on shocks on household labor allocation. What is the effect of the 
household’s knowledge of yield risk on labor decisions before and after they 
experience idiosyncratic shocks in the first part of the season? Third, I examine the 
impact of idiosyncratic shocks on yield risk. What is the relationship between 
idiosyncratic shocks and yield risk? Finally, I explore whether smallholder household 
labor allocation behavior insures their yields against idiosyncratic shock by reducing 
exposure to yield risk. 
 The theoretical framework for this paper is a two-period expected utility model 
where households make ex ante labor allocation decisions in the first period and both 
ex ante and ex post decisions in the second period. Ex ante labor allocation decisions 
are made based on observed shocks, ex ante yield risk and any other relevant 
information. On the other hand, ex post labor allocation decisions are made using ex 
post yield risk and other available information as variables. I assume the household 
knows the stochastic crop production technology from experience. In this thesis, I use 
the Just-Pope method to estimate the conditional variance of crop yield. Analyzing 
labor sequentially will enable us to explore the effects of temporal risk on labor 
allocation decisions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There has been a considerable amount of research into economic behavior in risky 
environments over the past few decades. Most of these studies have focused on 
agricultural production behavior and the role of risk in contexts such as savings, 
consumption, and agricultural production. The nature of agricultural decision making 
lends itself to several methods of analyses as it is fraught with risk from numerous 
sources which influence decision making.  
 Most studies have analyzed agricultural production behavior in three ways: 
structurally estimating risk preference and production technology parameters; 
experimental, nonstructural, or structural estimation of only risk preference 
parameters; and analyzing agricultural production decisions using a reduced form 
approach. The structural approach involves making assumptions about the utility 
functional form while the reduced form approach sometimes involves assuming a risk 
preference structure. In another group of studies, a second dimension is added by 
analyzing economic behavior in a dynamic/sequential framework. The majority of 
empirical studies investigating farmer risk attitudes have been consistent in their 
findings: they reject risk neutrality in favor of a risk averse behavior. However, the 
situation has been different for the findings on risk preference structure where results 
have been inconsistent or assumptions about underlying risk preference structures 
have varied from one study to another.  
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 The role of risk has also been studied extensively by incorporating some notion 
of risk or shocks into models (mostly dynamic) for analyzing production, consumption 
and savings decisions in rural areas of developing countries.  The findings from these 
studies have been conclusive and provide substantial evidence of the importance of 
risk in agriculture except for very few cases (e.g., Smith and Umali, 1985). In the next 
sections, I review a number of studies analyzing the role of risk in agricultural 
production and decision making. 
 
 
 
2.2 Stochastic Specification of Production Functions and Risk Considerations 
Just and Pope (1978) proposed stochastic specification of production function which 
allows for a flexible relationship between output variance and inputs. This 
specification ensures independence between the variance and mean of output. In their 
study, they demonstrated that by using common production specifications where the 
stochastic component is incorporated either multiplicatively or additively, the effect of 
agricultural inputs on output variability is positive a priori. In their paper on 
production function estimation and related risk considerations, Just and Pope (1979) 
used the stochastic specification they proposed earlier to estimate input effects on the 
probability distribution of output. They showed that by using their proposed stochastic 
specification, we can obtain consistent and efficient estimators for the variance and 
mean of output. Using yield data collected from a controlled experiment, they found 
that fertilizer had a variance-increasing effect on yield; however, the estimated 
marginal variance contribution was much smaller than one obtained using standard 
log-linear disturbance approach which assumes homoscedasticity. Their results 
demonstrated that the stochastic specification eliminates most of the bias resulting 
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from traditional production function, however, if the specification fails to take into 
account the direct effect of shocks on the deterministic and stochastic components of 
the production. The study also did not take into account the dynamic/sequential nature 
of the agricultural production which is important due to the timing of fertilizer 
application.  
 The Just-Pope variance estimator and its extensions have been used in other 
studies to examine the role of risk in agricultural. Kumbhakar and Tveterås (2003) 
using the Just-Pope framework derived a risk preference function under production 
risk and maximization of the expected utility of profit. They found evidence of 
heterogeneity among salmon farmers. Capital and labor were found to be risk-
decreasing while feed and fish input were risk-increasing. Consistent with other 
studies, farmers in the sample used were found to be risk averse. In addition they 
exhibited downside risk aversion. By using a risk preference function flexible enough 
to test for the different risk preference structures (e.g., increasing, constant, and 
decreasing absolute risk aversion), no assumptions were made about farmers’ risk 
behavior. In another study by Appelbaum and Ullah (1997), the demand and supply 
decisions of firms under uncertainty are analyzed in a framework which uses the 
principle of duality and non-parametric estimates of the first four moments of an 
unknown price distribution. They concluded that higher moment plays a significant 
role in determining input (demand) and output (supply) decisions. They rejected the 
null hypothesis of risk neutrality and concluded that producer response indicated risk 
aversion and are consistent with behavior under decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
 Holt and Moschini (1992) proposed an alternative measure of risk in 
commodity supply models. They investigated the role of price risk in sow farrowings 
using bivariate ARCH-M and GARCH-M models and a nonparametric kernel 
estimator. They accounted for the relevant time horizon of irreversible supply 
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decisions, predictions for mean price and conditional variance were iterated forward. 
They used a theoretical framework which specifically assumed that producers had a 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function and that price risk was 
conditionally normal. The concepts of ex ante mean and variance of price were briefly 
introduced. Their empirical results varied markedly in terms of their implication for 
risk response in hog supply decisions. The supply models estimated in a bivariate 
ARCH-M or GARCH-M framework suggested a small and negative risk effect on sow 
farrowing decisions and these were more plausible than those obtained using either a 
two-step parametric or non-parametric approach. 
 One of the commonest assumptions about the stochastic of conventional 
production function is tested in a study by Antle (1983). In the paper, a flexible 
representation of a firm’s stochastic technology was developed based on the moments 
of the probability distribution of output. Large sample estimators were developed for a 
linear moment model that is sufficiently flexible to test the implicit restriction imposed 
by conventional production function specifications. Using milk production data, the 
first three moments of output were found to be statistically significant functions of 
inputs. Cross-moment restrictions were however rejected. This is consistent with the 
stochastic structure of the production functions specification proposed by Just and 
Pope (JP) (1979).   
 In a related study of the stochastic component of production functions, 
Griffiths and Anderson (1982) proposed two production function models with error 
components for time and firm and a heteroscedastic disturbance. The two production 
models were two specifications based on the JP framework. The issue of 
heteroscedasticity was addressed with a non-linear heteroscedastic error model. Both 
specifications permit the variance of output to increase or decrease as one of the inputs 
is increased. Applying these models to data from the pastoral zone of eastern 
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Australia, they found labor, water and possibly fencing, were likely to reduce the 
variance of wool production. They also found that sheep, buildings and land, were 
likely to increase variance. The variance decreasing attribute of labor and fencing—
which may be considered as some form of capital—is consistent with the findings of 
other studies (e.g., Kumbhakar, 2002 and 2003). 
 
 
 
2.3 Consistency and Efficiency of Parameter Estimates  
In order to improve consistency and efficiency estimates there have been a number of 
studies where technology and risk preference parameters have been jointly estimated. 
In their paper, Saha et al. (1994) used the expo-power utility function which Saha 
(1993) had proposed in an earlier study to estimate the risk preference structure, 
degree of risk aversion and production technology of Kansas wheat farmers. In the 
1993 study, Saha empirically demonstrated the ability of the expo-power utility 
function to exhibit decreasing, constant, or increasing absolute risk aversion and 
decreasing or increasing relative risk aversion, depending on parameter values. A Just-
Pope specification of the production function was used for the analytical framework 
and also estimating the stochastic part of the production function. The study provided 
evidence which rejected risk neutrality and suggested decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA) and increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). Their results also 
showed that jointly estimated parameters were more efficient than separately 
estimated ones.  
 Using the joint estimation strategy, Chavas and Holt (1996) developed a 
method for estimating risk preferences and technology of corn-soybean farmers. Their 
approach was based on numerical methods nested within a Full Information Maximum 
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Likelihood (FIML) technique. This technique was used for estimating all the 
parameters of the production function and the first order conditions associated with the 
maximization of expected utility. Production and risk preference parameters were then 
recovered from results of the FIML estimation. The results of the study indicated that 
corn-soybean farmers were risk averse and exhibited DARA and downside risk.  
 Love and Buccola (LB) (1991) used a negative exponential utility function for 
representing risk preference and a Just-Pope specification of the Cobb-Douglas 
function for the technology of Iowa corn farmers. A negative exponential utility 
function implies CARA. By incorporating the two functional forms into a primal 
problem and solving for optimal input levels, they jointly estimated risk preference 
and technology parameters. Their estimates of risk aversion for different areas 
confirmed the common assumption that producers are risk averse. Surprisingly, some 
fertilizers (e.g., potassium) were found to be risk reducing. They therefore asserted 
that risk aversion and inputs’ effects on yield risk combined to have significant 
implications for supply and input demand.  
 Commenting on the LB study, Shankar and Nelson (1999) argued that 
depending on the manner in which production residual is modeled “(in)consistency” is 
not an issue. They constructed their argument by using a Just-Pope production 
specification to demonstrate that irrespective of the specification of risk preferences, 
separate estimation of production will result in consistent estimates. On the 
contentious issue of efficiency, they conceded that joint estimation may be desirable 
from an efficiency standpoint; however, they pointed out that this comes at the price of 
imposing “severe restrictions” on the modeling of preferences and/or technology. 
 
 
 
 12 
2.4 Stochastic and Dynamic Models for Analyzing Role of Risk 
In another class of studies, the dynamic/sequential nature of agricultural production 
and decision making in risky agricultural environments have been addressed by using 
dynamic or multiperiod models. Risk aversion is normally incorporated into these 
models (using an expected utility framework) to take into account the risk attitudes of 
decision makers. Fafchamps (1993) used a finite horizon stochastic model of behavior 
to analyze labor decisions of small farmers in Burkina Faso, West Africa. The 
parameters of the model (utility and production) were structurally estimated using 
iterative FIML. The estimation focused on measuring flexibility in production and 
intertemporal substitutability in consumption. The paper (p. 1173) concluded low 
levels of agricultural labor efforts commonly observed were a consequence of low 
productivity of labor and of farmers’ awareness that “in the absence of a labor market, 
overly ambitious production plans lead to seasonal manpower constraints.” The utility 
functional form chosen implicitly assumed CARA risk preference structure. With 
emphasis on the temporal nature of risk, Krautkraemer, Kooten and Young (1992) 
distinguished between intra- and inter-year risks in a temporal problem. They 
compared empirical results from three alternative treatment of risk (risk neutrality, 
Katoaka’s5
                                                 
5 The Katoaka criterion is a safety-first criterion where the decision maker is assumed to be risk neutral 
with respect to interyear uncertainty but exhibit risk aversion with respect to intrayear uncertainty 
(Krautkraemer, Kooten and Young, 1992). The source of uncertainty is soil moisture level.  
 and expected utility criterion) in a stochastic dynamic programming 
framework. In the case of the katoaka’s and expected utility criterion, farmers’ 
decisions are analyzed taking into account intra- and interyear risk aversion which 
raises issue about violation of the independence axiom. They (Krautkraemer et al., 
1992, p. 877) proceed to generalize “for most problems where risk and nonneutral risk 
preferences are clearly important, incorporating risk preferences (and violating or 
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bypassing the independence axiom) will probably bias the results less than assuming 
false risk neutrality.”  
 The seasonal labor utilization in agriculture among agrarian households in 
India was studied by Skoufias (1993) using a dynamic stochastic model of labor 
demand of farm households. Seasonality was modeled as a dynamic two stage process 
(planting and harvesting) with sequential dependence of decision. Risk aversion was 
incorporated into the theoretical model using a utility function to represent farmer risk 
preference. Panel data econometric methods were used to solve the problem of omitted 
variable bias due to farmer-specific heterogeneity. Yield risk was found to be an 
important determinant of behavior only in the planting stage. The paper suggested that 
ignoring the timing of application of labor inputs and/or heterogeneity arising from 
differences in risk preferences has a significant impact on estimated responses.   
 Under the assumption of risk averse behavior of farmers, Lamb (2003) 
developed a two-period model for analyzing fertilizer use, risk and off-farm labor 
market. The results suggested that off-farm labor and own-farm production may be 
complementary in risky production environments. The labor market was found as a 
means for the household to smooth income in the face of shocks to agricultural 
production. 
 
 
 
2.5 Analyses of Decision Making in Risky Agricultural Environments  
The response of rural household decisions to uncertainty has been studied in contexts 
such as storage, labor supply and savings. Many approaches have been used for 
analyzing the effect of risk on decision making. Other studies have treated this topic 
more theoretically (e.g., Sandmo, 1970). 
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 Kochar (1999) studied the response of Indian farm households to idiosyncratic 
or household-specific income shocks using a dynamic model which divides the 
agricultural season into two stages. The model is used to analyze the effects of forecast 
or surprise in income on labor decisions. The paper explained that smoothness of 
household consumption in the presence of idiosyncratic income shocks reflected the 
ability of the household to smooth income directly, by increasing their market hours of 
work.  
 Rose (2001) studied the ex ante and ex post labor supply response of rural 
Indian farm households to risk. A panel data set spanning 13 states in rural India 
merged with a 22-year series of district-level rainfall data were used.  It was found that 
ex ante, households facing riskier distribution of rainfall were more likely to 
participate in the labor market. Ex post, the experience of bad weather and low rainfall 
increased labor force participation. In this paper, panel regression methods were used 
to control for the effects of unobservable variables such as land quality. However, this 
correction does not completely remove omitted variable bias resulting from the 
experience of idiosyncratic shocks by households.  
 In a study of risk and savings by Udry (1995), the savings behavior of 
households in the presence of idiosyncratic adverse shocks in Northern Nigeria was 
examined using a reduced form approach.  The results of the study suggested that 
household reduce their savings by large amounts in response to adverse shocks on 
their upland plots. They also suggested that consumption smoothing is effected 
through adjustments in savings in assets not subject to diminishing returns. The data 
used for this study were panel in nature and these were used to control for time-
invariant unobservables using fixed effect regression.  
 The savings behavior of rural Pakistan households has also been analyzed 
using dynamic models. Behrman et al. (1997) using a stochastic dynamic multistage 
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agricultural household model examined the relative importance of alternative forms of 
savings in the presence and absence of formal financial intermediaries. They provided 
evidence that the presence of financial intermediaries importantly influences the use of 
formal saving and transfer for income smoothing. The evidence of income smoothing 
is consistent with the results of other studies. They also found significant biases in the 
evaluation of savings-income relationships that are inattentive to within-year dynamics 
of agricultural production. The theoretical framework for the study only considered 
production shock and failed to incorporate the possibility of forward-looking behavior 
which have been found in other studies.  
 In a theoretical study, Sandmo (1970) used a two-period model of consumption 
and investment to analyze the effect of uncertainty on savings decisions. Two types of 
uncertainty were considered: income and capital risk. By assuming risk aversion and 
that ex post variability goes together with ex ante uncertainty, it was concluded that 
there is a significant difference in the savings behavior between wage and salary 
earners, and self-employed persons. The paper argued that farmers and businessmen 
have more variable incomes than the self-employed. 
 The role of information in economic decision making has also been 
investigated in a number of studies. Chavas et al. (1991) investigated the role of 
temporal uncertainty and information issues in economic decisions. Using a two-
period model where the decision maker is assumed to be an economic agent facing a 
two-period planning horizon and a preference function in a dynamic programming 
framework. They showed that the nature of the economic environment can influence 
the valuation of information, which in turn affects choice functions considered in the 
study.  
 Saha and Stroud (1994) analyzed on-farm grain storage decisions of farmers 
facing price risk using a model of inventory demand. They further assumed that the 
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farm household maximizes a time-wise additively separable and time-invariant utility 
function over a time horizon of T periods. Their empirical results provided evidence 
against risk-neutral preferences. They also found that risk response was particularly 
significant for storage and labor decisions of small farmers.  
 Smith and Umali (1985) demonstrated that low levels of fertilizer use on 
rainfed rice in the Philippines could not be attributed to production risk. They used a 
random coefficients model to estimate the objective distribution of yield. They then 
incorporated it into a utility-maximization framework to predict the behavior of rice 
farmers in the Philippines. According to these predictions, moderately risk averse 
farmers apply seven to ten kilograms less than the profit-maximizing nitrogen-rate. 
They claimed that their results were consistent with other studies that found that risk 
was not a major impediment to fertilizer use in irrigated areas.  
 
 
 
2.6 Production Efficiency and the Effect of Shocks 
The sources of production inefficiencies have been explored by taking into account the 
possible role of both idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Some studies have directly or 
indirectly tested the hypothesis that shocks affect input productivity. Other studies 
have considered the caloric effect of consumption on productivity. 
 Larson and Plessmann (2009) used a detailed panel of household and 
production data and time series of temperature and rainfall data to explore why 
farmers often fail to achieve efficient production outcomes. The study focuses on rice 
production among farmers in the Bicol region of the Philippines. The household 
problem is stated as a time-separable lifetime consumption planning problem. They 
found evidence that diversification and input choices affect efficiency outcomes 
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among farmers, although the effects are not dominant. Efficiency outcomes were also 
determined by accumulated wealth, past decisions to invest, favorable market 
conditions and weather.  
 In another study of productive efficiency among West African rice farmers, 
Barrett et al. (2006) using a standard household model that maximizes utility subject 
to budget, time availability and technology constraints, explained how macroeconomic 
shocks might temporarily divert managerial attention. They found a transitory increase 
in mean plot-level technical inefficiency among Ivorian rice producers and 
considerable variation in the magnitude and persistence of this effect. The effect was 
attributable largely to ex ante complexity of operations, and the educational attainment 
and off-farm employment status of plot managers.  
 The impact of caloric consumption on production efficiency has been 
investigated among farm households in rural areas. Behrman et al. (1997) taking 
advantage of panel data on farm households from rural Pakistan, estimated the calorie 
response to the different components of income which included agricultural 
production. Similar to their study of savings decisions, they employed a stochastic 
dynamic multi-stage household model which assumes that households maximize 
expected discounted utility for analyzing consumption decisions and their productivity 
effects. Their estimates for calorie response indicated that the income-calorie 
relationship depended importantly on the production stage, form of income, liquidity 
of assets and the extent to which income is anticipated. Income shocks were found to 
have a significant positive effect on consumption during the harvest stage. 
 Some studies have jointly estimated risk, risk preferences and technical 
efficiency, an example of such a study is Kumbhakar (2002). In this paper, risk 
preferences and technical efficiency were estimated using two specifications: an 
additive model and a multiplicative model. In the additive model, the efficiency term 
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was introduced additively into the JP model. In the case of the multiplicative model, 
technical efficiency was introduced in a multiplicative form. No assumptions were 
made about the parametric form of the utility function and the distribution of the error 
term representing production risk. A sample of Norwegian salmon farms was used to 
illustrate the workings of the model. The study found that all farmers were risk averse. 
Evidence was presented to the effect that production risk increased with feed and 
decreased with labor and capital. Consequently, technical inefficiency was found to be 
positively related to feed and negatively related to labor and capital. This finding is 
consistent with other studies.   
 
 
 
2.7 Dynamic Agricultural Production Models and Input Decisions 
There is considerable literature on production function analysis which has 
incorporated the dynamic/sequential nature of agricultural production. Some of these 
studies have proposed econometric methodologies for analyzing dynamic production 
processes in agriculture. These methodologies address the problem arising from 
intermediate inputs: intermediate input decisions may be endogenous to final output 
and intermediate inputs are likely to be correlated with each other and other variables, 
making identification and estimation difficult. These methodologies have been 
extended to other studies by incorporating risk into them. 
 In the study of sequential decision making in production models, Antle (1983a) 
formulated a short-run single-product production model with a stochastic control 
framework and explored its implications for specifying and estimating econometric 
production models. The analysis in this paper demonstrated that sequential solutions 
generally result in input demand equations which differ from those of one-period 
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solutions. The paper also demonstrated that depending on assumptions about 
information used and data availability, sequential solutions may produce models 
which require either single-equation or simultaneous-equation estimation methods. 
Using four different information sets, four types of solutions to the problem were 
obtained: open loop control, sequential updating, open loop with feedback and close 
loop solution. The framework for analysis was a two-period Cobb-Douglas model.  
 Antle and Hatchett (1986) in their study developed an econometric 
methodology for estimating dynamic models with sequential intermediate input 
decisions. A Cobb-Douglas specification was used to represent the production 
function. They viewed crop production as a dynamic optimization problem, with input 
decisions made sequentially in response to the state of the production system. The 
dynamic optimization problem was solved to obtain a system of demand equation 
which was estimated econometrically using four different approaches: static single-
stage, static three-stage, dynamic linear system and dynamic non-linear system. The 
estimates of the dynamic models were found to be consistent and more efficient than 
the static models. Even though the Cobb-Douglas specification was restrictive and 
implicitly imposed many assumptions about the stochastic structure of the system, the 
study provided a basis for analyzing production risk and its role in decision making. 
The study ignored unexplained differences across farms; however, this was addressed 
by using wheat production data obtained from six large farms in the Imperial Valley of 
California for the harvest seasons 1980 to 1983. 
 Agricultural production processes have been modeled in the context of 
livestock production. Chavas et al. (1985) in their study modeled a crop and livestock 
production process. They explained that crop and livestock production processes are 
typically dynamic and involve growing biological assets. A production model of 
biological growth based on a differential equation specification was used.  
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They suggested that knowledge of biological growth needs to be incorporated into the 
study of economic efficiency of production processes of a biological nature since 
biological processes are dynamic in nature. 
 In a paper discussing the importance of incorporating risk in production 
analysis, Antle (1983b) used a dynamic and static model and a risk-efficiency 
hypothesis to analyze the role of risk in agricultural decision making. The risk-
efficiency hypothesis states that risks affect both productivity and optimal resource 
used and, hence, economic and technical efficiency. The paper concluded that 
incorporating risk in production analysis means incorporating probability distribution 
parameters in decision models. It also concluded that static models have serious 
limitations in that risk matters only if decision makers are risk averse, and they cannot 
be used to model cost uncertainty. On the other hand, dynamic models support the 
risk-efficiency hypothesis and risk matters whether or not the decision maker is risk 
averse. 
 
 
 
2.8 Econometric and Experimental Risk Estimation  
The impact of risk on agricultural decision making has been investigated by jointly or 
separately estimating risk preference and technology parameters, these parameters are 
then used to make inferences about decision making. Risk preference has also been 
estimated by joint estimation of the structure of technology and input decision rules. 
Other studies have investigated the role risk plays in decision making by estimating 
risk preference using nonstructural econometric or experimental methods.  
 Antle (1989) estimated risk attitudes using a nonstructural approach. This 
approach did not require joint estimation of the firm’s technology and input decision 
 21 
rules. A nonstructural approach replaced optimal input choice with the assumption that 
farmers optimally manage their portfolios of productive activities. It also utilized 
changes in patterns of net returns distributions over time to estimate the parameters of 
the distribution of risk attitudes in the population. Risk attitudes were estimated in 
three Indian villages and the results were compared to previous experimental and 
econometric estimates from the same villages. One advantage of the nonstructural 
approach is that it requires fewer modeling assumptions than the structural approach. 
Furthermore, it requires less information; however, it provides the researcher with 
only the estimates of risk attitudes as compared to the structural approach which 
provides estimates of the technology and decision rules as well.   
 Risk attitudes have been estimated in other studies using the experimental 
approach. Binswanger (1980) measured the risk attitudes of 240 households using two 
methods: an interview method eliciting certainty equivalents and an experimental 
gambling approach with real payoffs which, at their maximum, exceeded monthly 
income for unskilled laborers. The author conceded that the interviews were subject to 
interview bias and results were totally inconsistent with the experimental measures of 
risk aversion. The study concluded that at high payoff levels, virtually all individuals 
are moderately risk averse with little variation according to personal characteristics. 
Wealth was found to reduce risk aversion slightly, but its effect was not statistically 
significant.  
 In a similar study also measuring risk attitude, Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) 
used experiments involving choice between risky and sure farm alternatives to assess 
the risk attitudes of samples of small farm owners and sharecroppers in Brazil. Their 
results indicated most subsistence farmers were risk averse, and risk aversion tended 
to be more common and perhaps greater among owners than sharecroppers. 
Estimation of risk attitude coefficients was based on mean-standard deviation, mean-
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variance, and exponential utility functions. They concluded in an expected utility 
context, distribution of risk attitude coefficients was diverse and not necessarily well 
represented by an average sample value. They also found that the level of income and 
other socioeconomic variables influence peasants’ attitudes towards risk. 
 Using an econometric approach, Moscardi et al. (1977) derived the risk 
attitudes of peasants in Puebla, Mexico, from survey data using a model of safety-first 
behavior. Measurements of behavior toward risk were explained by a set of 
socioeconomic and structural variables that characterize peasant households. They 
proposed that knowledge of the determinants of attitudes toward risk is useful for the 
purpose of tailoring technological recommendations to particular categories of 
peasants. Based on the results of the study, they concluded that risk aversion is 
responsible for substantial differences between the demand for fertilizer without risk 
and actual demand with risk. This conclusion was also supported by high estimated 
risk premiums discouraging the use of high rates of fertilizer under safety-first 
behavior. 
 The results of the above and other studies have been widely used for estimating 
the risk attitudes of decision makers. However, extrapolating the results of these 
studies for the purpose of understanding decision making in the presence risk without 
taking into account the differences in technology, constraints and other factors can 
lead to misleading conclusions about role of risk in agriculture. 
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2.9 Conclusion 
The studies reviewed in the previous sections which involved the estimation or 
elicitation of risk preferences have generally confirmed the assumption of risk averse 
behavior among decision makers in rural areas of developing countries. For studies 
involving the estimation of risk attitudes, the distribution of the coefficients of risk 
aversion has varied. One possible explanation for this variation is the differences in 
the characteristics and environments of subjects in the sample used for the estimation. 
Another possible source of these differences is variation in methodology or approach 
employed in these studies. Therefore, in order to be able to accurately predict the 
behavior of decision makers, it is important to consider the environment or settings in 
which they make decisions.  
 There have also been inconsistencies in direct or implicit assumptions about 
risk preference structures used in a number of risk studies. Some studies have tested 
directly for risk preference structure and the results have been mixed. Saha (1993) 
found evidence of DARA and IRRA while Chavas and Holt (1996) found a CARA 
risk preference structure. Love and Buccola (1991) implicitly assumed CARA using 
an exponential utility function for representing risk preference. These inconsistencies 
have been resolved in some studies by using flexible functional forms which do not 
impose any restrictions of the risk preference structure. However, this approach 
normally has high data requirements due to the problem of increased parameter 
identification demands.  
 Other risk studies have focused on investigating the influence of agricultural 
inputs on the variance of output. There seems to be a consensus about the negative 
influence of labor and capital on output risk (e.g., Griffiths and Anderson, 1982; 
Kumbhakar, 2002; Kumbhakar and Tveterås, 2003). Fertilizer has been found to have 
a positive influence on the variance of output; however, Love and Buccola (1991) 
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found that potassium has a negative effect on variance. In a study of the effect of 
fertilizer on risk, Rosegrant and Roumasset (1985), using a heteroscedastic production 
function with measurable stochastic inputs, found that estimating optimal inputs 
without environment-specific information about the sources of risk leads to large 
errors. They also suggested that moderate risk aversion can account for 6.7 to 16.7 
percent reduction in nitrogen use (relative to the risk-neutral solution) for selected rice 
producing area of the Philippines. This shows that it may be possible that nitrogen has 
a positive effect on risk in some environments. The implication of these findings is 
that it is important to consider type or content of fertilizer when studying the effect of 
inputs on risk. They asserted that the influence of measurable stochastic inputs on risk 
underscores the value of collecting information about the sources of risk and of 
exercising caution when information is not available.  
 On the issue of consistency and efficiency of parameters of technology and 
risk preference, some authors have proposed the joint estimation of risk and 
technology structure of decision makers (Chavas and Holt, 1991; Love and Buccola, 
1991; Saha et al., 1994) is important if the research is interested in obtaining 
consistent and efficient estimates. However, Shankar and Nelson (1999) argued that 
depending on the manner in which production residual is modeled “(in)consistency” is 
not an issue. They constructed their argument by using a Just-Pope production to 
demonstrate that irrespective of the specification of risk preferences, separate 
estimation of production will result in consistent estimates. Although the econometric 
issues of consistency and efficiency are far from resolved, the use of flexible 
functional forms for modeling production and variance seem to be very promising 
based on the empirical demonstration of their ability to at least consistently estimate 
parameters of risk preference and technology. 
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 In this thesis, I examine the role of idiosyncratic shocks in smallholder labor 
allocation in Ghana. I assume that similar to covariate shocks (Barrett et al., 2006), 
idiosyncratic shocks are a possible source of production or yield risk in rural areas of 
developing countries. I incorporate the concept of ex ante and ex post risk (variance) 
articulated by Sandmo (1970) and mentioned briefly by Holt and Moschini (1992) in 
their study into a two-period expected utility model where households make ex ante 
labor allocation decisions in the first period and ex post decisions in the second period. 
Using this framework and a panel data set, I analyze the impact of idiosyncratic 
shocks on labor decisions, productivity and yield risk.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Two-Period Household Labor Allocation Model 
The farm inputs to be considered in the analysis of on-farm input allocation are labor 
and land.6
( )⋅U
 The theoretical framework for this thesis is based on a two-period utility 
model. I assume that household preferences are represented by a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function  which is twice differentiable. In addition, the utility 
function satisfies, ( ) 0>⋅′U  and ( ) 0<⋅′′U , indicating local non-satiation and risk 
aversion, respectively. I further assume the household has a yield function represented 
by ( )⋅f  which they know through experience and observation of neighbors and has the 
following properties: ( ) 0≥⋅f , ( ) 0>⋅′f and ( ) 0<⋅′′f . Households are assumed to 
allocate on-farm labor to maximize expected utility of terminal wealth subject to their 
crop production technology and labor constraints. The assumption that households 
have labor constraints might not necessarily be the case. In this thesis, this is not tested 
due to lack of data on household labor availability by round. The households are 
assumed to supply all their on-farm labor since most households in Akwapim South 
rely on their own labor for crop production. I assume that crop production does not 
involve any costs. There are virtually no purchased inputs in this system and the 
valuation of on-farm labor is a complicated exercise which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 This thesis focuses on the ex ante and ex post effects of risk on household on-
farm labor allocation. The household production decision process is made amenable to 
                                                 
6 Chemicals are dropped from the analysis because only a few households used them. 
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a stochastic dynamic household model by dividing the household production decision 
process into two periods based on the crop production cycle of maize. In the first 
period, on-farm labor allocation decisions are made based on factors which include ex 
ante yield risk, shocks realized (from previous period) and expected future shocks. 
Shocks are realized by the start of the second period. Ex ante yield risk is represented 
by conditional yield variance in the planting period. Since the household does not 
know how much on-farm labor they will allocate in the preharvest period, they form 
expectations about on-farm labor which they use to determine the conditional yield 
variance they will face. The household incorporates this new information into their 
labor allocation decisions and hence updates its subjective yield risk perception.7
 The first period is termed “planting period” and the second period “pre-harvest 
period.” The planting period is the period from planting until crop establishment. The 
pre-harvest period is the period after crop establishment until maturity. Harvest period 
labor is excluded from the analysis in this thesis due to the proportionality between 
yield and harvest period labor (Fafchamps, 1993).  
 
 To solve the household decision problem, I employ assumptions similar to 
those used by Antle (1983) for finding open loop solutions in the sequential crop 
production model.8
 
  The problem can be expressed as: 
(1) EMax
wf ll 11,
( )2, 22 WUMaxwf ll  
 
 
                                                 
7 I use the term ex post yield risk to refer to the updated yield risk in the pre-harvest period of the 
season. 
8 The open loop control solution found by Antle (1983) uses the sequential dependence property 
assumption. This states that decisions made earlier may affect those made later. This is similar to 
backward induction. 
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..ts  
The stochastic laws of motion for wealth 
(2) 11101 IAlpCWW ww ++−=  
(3) 222212 IAlpCAypWW wwy ++−+=  
The Just-Pope stochastic yield function for the household 
(4) ( ) ( )ε102110212 ,,,,,, 2
1
ssllhssllfy ffff +=    
The household labor constraint  
(5) pwpfp Lll =+       where 2,1=p   
where 0W , 1W  and 2W  denotes the initial, intermediate and terminal period wealth of 
the household, respectively; 2y  denotes maize yield (output per acre) during the 
harvest period of the cropping season at the end of period 2; yp  is the output price per 
kg for maize; wpl is the household non-farm labor allocated per acre in period p; wp the 
market wage rate; A is the predetermined area before the beginning of the season; fpl is 
household labor allocated to crop production per acre in period p; pL  denotes 
household labor availability per acre in period p ; ps  denotes idiosyncratic shocks 
experienced by the household in period p , and pI  denotes exogenous income earned 
by the household from crops other than maize and non-farm activities in period p . 
pC is household subsistence (exogenous) consumption requirement in period p ; ε  is 
the stochastic disturbance term with zero mean and constant variance.        
 Household- and plot-specific idiosyncratic shocks are incorporated into the 
household crop production technology based on the assumption that the total amount 
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of effective on-farm work done is a function of idiosyncratic shocks experienced by 
the household.9
 
 Effective on-farm labor allocation is represented as: 
( )0111 , slll fefef =      ( )10222 ,, sslll fefef =  
Therefore information on idiosyncratic shocks is assumed to affect the productivity of 
labor allocated by the household.  
 Using backward induction, I first consider the household decision problem in 
the second period. The household allocates labor to maximize the utility of terminal 
wealth subject to their crop production technology and labor constraints.  
(6)    ( ) ( )2,2 22 WUMaxWU wf ll=
∗
  
..ts  
 (7) 222211102 IAlpCAypIAlpCWW wwyww ++−+++−=  
 (8) ( ) ( )ε102110212 ,,,,,, 2
1
ssllhssllfy ffff +=  
 (9) 222 Lll wf =+  
The above problem can be expressed as the lagrangean 2α  below: 
(10) ( ) ( )222122 LllWU wf −+−≡ λα  
Taking a partial derivative with respect to 22 , wf ll and the lagrangean multiplier, 1λ , the 
first order conditions are: 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
2
1
12222
2
2 2
1
=−




 ⋅+⋅=
∂
∂ − λε
α
lflfylf
f
hhfApWU
l
 
(12) ( ) 0122
2
2 =−=
∂
∂
λ
α
wlw
w
pWU
l
 
 222 Lll wf =+  
                                                 
9 This is based on Behrman et al. (1997), where in order to allow for the possibility that calories 
influence productivity total amount of effective work is distinguished from the number of days 
contributed by workers. 
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Solving the above set of first order conditions simultaneously, I obtain the optimal 
allocation rules ( )⋅∗ 2fl , and ( )⋅∗2wl for the preharvest period. The first order conditions 
can alternatively be expressed as: 
(13) 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) y
w
lw
lflflf
w
f
p
p
WU
hhfAWU
lWU
lWU
=





 ⋅+⋅
=
∂∂
∂∂
−
22
2222
22
22
.
2
1
2
1
ε
 
OR  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )222222 .2
1
2
1
WUphhfAWUp lwwlflflfy =




 ⋅+⋅ − ε  
The household uses the output price and the market wage rate as weights for valuing 
the marginal utility it derives from crop production and participating in the labor 
market. In the preharvest period, labor is allocated between crop production and other 
income generating activities such that the marginal utility derived from both activities 
are equal. 
 In the planting period of the cropping season, the household allocates on-farm 
inputs to maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth subject to their crop 
production technology and labor constraints. I assume that the household knows and 
uses the optimal allocation rule ( )⋅∗ 2fl , and ( )⋅∗2wl  in the preharvest period. This 
assumption is similar to the “sequential dependence of decisions feature of sequential 
solutions” proposed by Antle (1983) and the idea of backward induction. Therefore 
using the decision rules for optimal on-farm input allocation, for the first period we 
solve: 
(14) ( )∗2, 11 WEUMaxwf ll  
..ts  
(15)  ( ) 212121202 IIllApCCAypWW wwwy ++++−−+= ∗∗  
(16) ( )( ) ( )( )ε10211021 ,,,,,, 2
1
ssllhssllfy ffff ⋅+⋅=
∗∗  
(17) 111 Lll wf =+  
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The lagrangean 1α  form of the problem is: 
(18) ( ) ( )111121 LllWEU wf −+−≡ ∗ µα  
Taking derivatives with respect to 11, wf ll  and the lagrangean multiplier, 1µ , the first 
order conditions are:  
(19) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0..
2
1. 11121
1
1 2
1
=−









 +=
∂
∂ −∗ µε
α
lflflfy
f
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(20) ( ){ } 0121
1
1 =−=
∂
∂ ∗ µ
α
WUEp
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Equations (17), (19), and (20) can be solved simultaneously to get household optimal 
allocation decision rules ( )⋅∗1fl , and ( )⋅∗1wl   in the planting period. Similar to (13) the first 
order condition for the planting period can be written as: 
(21) 
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In the planting period, the household allocates labor subject to its labor constrain such 
that the expected marginal utility from crop production is equal to the expected 
marginal utility from participating in the labor market. The market wage rate and 
output price are used for valuing the marginal utilities for wage income and crop 
production, respectively. The household adopts a flexible approach in their labor 
allocation. They make labor allocation decisions based on available information and 
update their knowledge as temporal yield uncertainty is gradually resolved. 
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 From the above, I obtain a system of equations consisting of optimal decision 
rules for each period which constitute the optimal on-farm input policy of the 
household. The reduced form of the solutions can be written as: 
(22) ( )22222111011022 ,,,,,,,,,,,,, σLCICIssllppAWll wfwyww =∗  
(23) ( )22222111011022 ,,,,,,,,,,,,, σLCICIssllppAWll wfwyff =∗  
(24) ( )212121210011 ,,,,,,,,,,, σLLIICCsAppWll wyff =∗  
(25) ( )212121210011 ,,,,,,,,,,, σLLIICCsAppWll wyww =∗   
where x refers to mean of x  and 2pσ  denotes the conditional variance of wealth in 
period p .                                                                                                                      
 Since most farmers are risk averse, an increase in yield risk is expected to 
negatively affect on-farm labor allocation in the planting and preharvest period as 
farmers opt instead for safer non-farm employment income. Therefore, non-farm labor 
allocations for the planting and preharvest periods are positively related to yield risk. 
They use this strategy to smooth their incomes and thereby reduce the variance of 
terminal wealth ( )2W . The nature of crop production makes it riskier than labor market 
participation.  
 The decision rules for preharvest labor allocations depend on the functional 
forms for ( )⋅f  and thus on ∗
∗
∂
∂
1
2
w
w
l
l and
∗
∗
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l
, which represent the marginal rates of 
substitution of preharvest labor for planting period labor in each sector. The 
relationship between initial wealth and labor allocation
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also ambiguous.  
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 Idiosyncratic shocks such as health shocks can decrease the quality and 
quantity of labor available and therefore are expected to have a negative effect on crop 
yields. We would expect this to adversely affect labor allocation to crop production 
and potentially to non-farm employment as well. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
SURVEY REGION AND DATA 
 
4.1 Data Collection  
Data for this study were obtained from panel surveys conducted in 1997/98 among 
smallholder farm households in the Akwapim South district of southern Ghana. The 
survey was run from November 1996 to August 1998.10 Questionnaires were 
administrated to 213 households out of 240 initially sampled. A total of 436 
individuals were surveyed over the 15 rounds (Table 4.1 and 4.2).11
 
 The average 
period between rounds was about 2 months. The sample was constructed in two 
stages: purposive selection of villages in four clusters near Nsawam and Aburi, and 
then a random selection of 60 households from each cluster from the first stage (Udry 
and Goldstein, 1998). The villages are: Oboadaka, Pokrom, Konkonuru and Darmang-
Ahweriase. Oboadaka, Darmang-Ahweriase and Pokrom are near Nsawam while 
Konkonuru is near Aburi. Nsawam is the district capital of Akwapim South, about 
40km north of Accra, the capital of Ghana. Due to its proximity to the capital, it serves 
as a commercial centre for nearby villages. Aburi is also near the capital, about 45 
minutes drive. Data were collected on variables such as household assets, output sales, 
quantity of harvest, plot activities, lending, borrowing, non-farm income, family 
expenses, and shocks experienced by the household. 
                                                 
10 The survey was conducted by Christopher Udry of the Department of Economics, Yale University 
and Markus Goldstein of the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley. The data can be found at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2//ghanadata.html 
11 Rounds refer to a data collection period during which questionnaires are administered to respondents. 
Therefore for this panel survey, respondents were surveyed a total of 15 times from November 1996 to 
August 1998. Variables for which data are collected are described in section A.2 of Appendix A. 
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Table 4.1—Number of Participants in Survey by Village 
Survey Period Participants  Konkonuru Oboadaka Pokrom Darmang Total 
Nov 96-Aug 98 
Households 54 51 57 51 213 
Individuals 112 102 111 106 429  
  
 In this thesis, I focus on smallholder farm households who cultivated maize 
and reported/experienced idiosyncratic shocks between the period November 1996 and 
August 1998.  Based on these criteria, a total of 125 households were selected. The 
total number of plots owned by these households was 238, which imply most 
households cultivated maize on more than one plot. The selection process resulted in 
an unbalanced panel data set with multiple cropping seasons for all households and 
multiple plots in multiple seasons for most. 
 
Table 4.2—Number of Households/Plots selected for Study by Village 
Observational Units Konkonuru Oboadaka Pokrom Darmang Total 
Number of Households 29 44 13 39 125 
Number of Plots 49 99 16 74 238 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Smallholder Crop Production in Akwapim South 
The four villages selected for this study are all located in the deciduous forest agro-
ecological zones (Figure 4.1). Average annual rainfall in this region is 1500mm with 
major (beginning in March) and minor (beginning in September) rainy seasons 
(Morris et al., 1999). The length of the growing seasons in the major and minor 
seasons is 150-160 and 90 days, respectively (AQUASTAT Survey, 2005; Morris et 
al., 1999). The major food crops grown in this area are maize, plantain, cassava and 
other roots (Table 4.3). Crop production in this region, similar to most parts of Ghana, 
is rainfed thereby increasing the riskiness of production.  
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Figure 4.1—Agro-ecological Zones in Ghana 
Source: http://www.fao.org/ag/aGL/swlwpnr/reports/y_sf/z_gh/gh_map/ghmp2301.gif 
 In addition to the crops above, smallholder households in Akwapim South 
cultivate a variety of cash crops including oranges, palm oil, pineapple, pepper, garden 
eggs, okra, and other vegetables. Most smallholder farm households engage in crop 
production primarily for subsistence. This coupled with diversification partly explains 
why these household cultivate multiple crops. For most smallholder farm households, 
land is not a constraint since they can easily rent land under various arrangements if 
they do not own land. Cassava and maize are the two most widely cultivated crops in 
Akwapim South (Table 4.3). Maize has a long shelf life and therefore can be stored for 
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long periods of time and sold on the market when prices increase. Cassava on the 
other hand, does not have a long shelf life; however, it can be left in the field for long 
periods and harvested when needed.  
 In this thesis, I analyze on-farm input allocation behavior in the context of 
maize production. I focus on maize production for two reasons. First, maize is 
biannual and therefore we can analyze production decisions using short panel data that 
impede analysis of pineapple and cassava which are perennials with much longer 
periods of maturity. Certain improved varieties of maize have maturity periods as 
short as 90 days. Second, maize is the second most widely cultivated crop in terms of 
acreage and frequency in Akwapim South (Table 4.3).  
 
Table 4.3—Frequency of Crop Cultivation  
Crop Freq. Percent 
Cassava 209 25.71 
Maize 206 25.34 
Pineapple 91 11.19 
Others 307 37.76 
Total 813 100.00 
Notes: Frequency refers to the number of households in the full 
sample (for all three seasons) who cultivate a particular crop.  Not  
all household cultivate each crop; however, it is worth noting that 
most households in the data cultivate at least 2 crops.  
 
 
 
 
4.3 Idiosyncratic Shocks Experienced by Households in Akwapim South 
The survey period for the data collection covered three growing seasons for maize. 
Most households in the four villages cultivate maize at least twice a year. Due to the 
pattern of rainfall distribution over the year, households have a fixed calendar for 
maize cultivation. The first growing season begins in March while the second begins 
in September. Maize normally matures in about three months after planting and 
 38 
therefore June-July and November-December are harvesting periods for the major and 
minor maize seasons, respectively.                                                                                   
 During the season households experience different types of idiosyncratic 
shocks which include damage to crops in storage and in the field, unexpected 
household expenses, negative health events, loss of productive assets, and theft of 
crops in the field. Data were collected on shocks by asking respondents to self-report 
negative events they experienced in the previous round. Crops in storage include 
maize, yams, cassava and other crops harvested by the household. Examples of 
unexpected household expenses are funeral expenses, church donation, and 
unexpected increase in prices. Table 4.4 presents summary statistics for the incidence 
of idiosyncratic shocks over the three seasons considered. Only a small percentage of 
households experienced shocks in season 1 and season 2. No shocks were reported 
except for unexpected expenses, damage to crops and negative health events. Negative 
health events are experienced in all three seasons, however, only a very small 
percentage (as low as 0.08%) of households experienced these shocks. Plot level 
shocks are divided into damage to maize and damage to other crops in the field. 
Sources of damage to crops include insect attacks, fire, disease attacks, and scorching. 
As a consequence of the nature of certain types of idiosyncratic shocks, they can lead 
to large effects on labor allocation and subsequently on crop yields.  
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Table 4.4—Idiosyncratic Shocks Experience by Household in Sample 
  
Percentage of 
Households/Plots 
 Season 
Variable 1 2 3 
Plot Level Shocks    
Damage to maize in  previous harvest and preharvest  period  0 0 0 
Damage to maize in  planting  period  0 2.67 1.89 
Damage to other crops in  previous harvest and preharvest  period  0 0 5.66 
Damage to other crops in planting  period  1.42 16 11.32 
Household Level Shocks    
Damage to stored crop in previous harvest and preharvest period 0 0 4.35 
Damage to stored crop in planting period 0 0 30.43 
Unexpected expenses in previous harvest and preharvest period 0 0 0 
Unexpected expenses in planting period 1.02 0 56.52 
Negative health events in previous harvest and preharvest period 0.08 0.41 0.11 
Negative health events in planting period 0.18 0.52 0.3 
 Notes: The planting period is the period from planting until crop establishment. The pre-harvest period 
is the period after crop establishment until maturity while the harvest period refers to the period during 
which harvesting takes place. All variables are dummies: takes a value of 1 if the shock occurred and 0 
if otherwise.  
  
 
 The data for idiosyncratic shocks are divided into periods (planting, preharvest, 
and harvest) based on the maize growing season. This has the benefit of making it 
easier to incorporate information on ex post shocks into the analysis. Hence 
information on shocks from the second part of the previous season (preharvest and 
harvest period) is taken into consideration by the household when they make decisions 
on maize production for the first part (planting period) of the current season. 
 
 
4.4 Household Crop Production Decisions, Uncertainty, and Idiosyncratic Shocks 
Previous studies have established the significance of the role played by uncertainty in 
agricultural production decisions. Due to the sequential nature of the agricultural 
production process, risk averse farmers consider temporal risk when making decisions. 
Figure 4.2 presents a kernel density plot of maize yield for all three seasons 
considered. The plot shows a significant change in the variance of yield over the three 
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seasons. The standard deviations of maize yields (plot level) for the season 1, 2, and 3 
were 116.48, 91.84, and 81.81 kg per acre, respectively, while the means were 78.74, 
68.11, and 76.48 kg per acre, respectively (see Table 4.5). These high coefficients of 
variation for yield (see Table B.2) indicate that maize production is highly risky and 
that risk varies by season. 
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Figure 4.2—Distribution of Household Maize Yield 
 Table 4.5 reports descriptive statistics for household production, household 
characteristics and risk. For each of the seasons considered in the analysis for this 
study, about 85% of household heads had at least one year of schooling.                   
The same situation applies to occupation: 90% of household heads in the sample are 
farmers. The average age is about 43 years. The average planting period non-farm 
labor for seasons 1, 2 and 3 were 4.96, 0, and 21.25 days, respectively. The zero value 
for season 2 is as a result of households not reporting their planting period non-farm 
labor. In the case of the preharvest period non-farm labor, households report non-farm 
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labor activity for only season 2. These low levels of non-farm labor mean that non-
farm income constitutes a small portion of total household income. Season 2 is 
relatively shorter than season 1 and 3 which are both major rainy seasons. 
 
 
Table 4.5—Descriptive Statistics for Production, Household Characteristics and Risk 
  Mean 
Variable Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 
Production    
Maize yield (kg/acre) 78.74 68.11 76.48 
Planting labor (days/acre) 3.51 6.47 11.59 
Preharvest labor (days/acre) 11.95 10.19 17.81 
Acreage 5.28 5.76 3.68 
Household Characteristics    
Occupation (1 if head is a farmer and 0 if otherwise) 0.90 0.88 0.91 
Education (1 if head had schooling and 0 if otherwise) 0.88 0.83 0.85 
Planting period non-farm labor (days/acre) 4.96 0.00 21.26 
Preharvest period non-farm labor (days/acre) 0.00 24.92 0.00 
Planting period farm income (¢) 347000 379000 534000 
Preharvest period farm income (¢) 272000 103000 209000 
Initial Wealth (¢) 1470000 1080000 2710000 
Risk Measure of Maize Yield (standard deviation)    
Standard deviation of maize yield (kg/acre) 116.48 91.84 81.81 
 
 Comparison of the distribution of input allocation for each of the three seasons 
provides evidence of household response to uncertainty. Figure 4.3 and 4.4 display 
kernel density plots of plot level labor use in maize production for each of the three 
seasons. Given that most household heads are farmers, one might expect relative 
stability in the amount of labor allocated per acre of land cultivated. However, Figure 
4.3 shows a drastic change in the distribution of planting labor per acre from season to 
season.12
                                                 
12 See Table B.2 of Appendix B for the coefficients of variation for planting period labor for each of the 
three seasons. 
 Season 1 is skewed to the left and has a shorter tail as compared to those of 
seasons 2 and 3. The high number of zero- or near-zero-valued observations recorded 
for the planting period of season 1 is probably as a result of transient measurement 
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errors in recording labor in the first survey round or two. Another explanation is 
under-reporting by respondents in the first few survey rounds. One possible sources of 
this change in distribution is yield uncertainty and the experience of negative events at 
the household and plot level. 
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Figure 4.3—Distribution of Household Planting Period Labor Allocation 
 
 
Preharvest labor is comparatively more stable in terms of the variation for each 
season.13
 
 Figure 4.3 represents kernel density plots for each season. There is a gradual 
shift in the distribution of preharvest labor. The plot for season 3 has longer tails than 
the first two seasons.    
 
                                                 
13 See Table B.2 of Appendix B for the coefficients of variation for preharvest period labor for each of 
the three seasons. 
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Figure 4.4—Distribution of Household Preharvest Period Labor 
 
Table 4.6 gives an outline of the maize production decision making process of 
smallholder farm households in Akwapim South. For this thesis, I make the 
simplifying assumption that the effects of idiosyncratic shocks do not persist beyond 
the current or immediately subsequent season. During the preseason (before planting 
in March) period, the household experiences shocks ( 0s ) that are taken into account 
when making crop production decision (land preparation, planting and weeding) in the 
first planting period (March 1997). Shocks ( 0s , 1s ) experienced by the household 
during the planting period of season 1, and the preharvest and harvest period of the 
previous season are considered when making decisions in the first preharvest period 
(April-June 1997). Labor allocated during the harvest period is very likely to be 
proportional to yield. Therefore, idiosyncratic shocks are likely to have an 
insignificant effect on harvest period labor. From experience the household knows the 
required amount of labor per acre for harvesting maize in the field.  
  
Table 4.6—Household Maize Production Calendar and Decision Making 
6420 ,,, ssss : Shocks experienced by household in the preharvest and harvest period of the previous season e.g., damage to crops, unexpected household 
expense.  
531 ,, sss : Shocks experienced by household in the planting period of the current season  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  SEASON 0 SEASON 1 SEASON 2 SEASON 3 
PERIOD 
Harvest 
Period 
Planting 
Period 
Preharvest 
Period 
Harvest 
Period 
Planting 
Period 
Preharvest 
Period 
Harvest 
Period 
Planting 
Period 
Preharvest 
Period 
Harvest 
Period 
MONTH Nov-Feb Mar Apr-Jun July Aug Sep-Dec Jan March April-Jun July 
SURVEY 
ROUNDS 1-3 4 5 6 7 8-9 10 11 12-14 15 
MAIN 
ACTIVITY None 
planting, 
land 
preparation, 
weeding 
weeding, 
other farm 
operations Harvest 
planting, 
land 
preparation, 
weeding 
 weeding, 
other farm 
operations  Harvest 
planting, 
land 
preparation, 
weeding 
 weeding, 
other farm 
operations  Harvest 
SHOCKS 0s  1s  2s  3s  4s  5s  6s  
TYPE OF 
DECISION 
RULE ---  Ex ante Ex post --- Ex ante Ex post --- Ex ante Ex post --- 
NEW 
SHOCK 
INFO 
ARRIVING 
I assume 
harvest labor 
is 
proportional 
to produce. 0s  0s  , 1s  
I assume 
harvest labor 
is 
proportional 
to produce. 2s  2s  , 3s  
I assume 
harvest 
labor is 
proportional 
to produce. 4s  4s , 5s  
I assume 
harvest 
labor is 
proportio-
nal to 
produce. 
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 In the season 2, when households are making crop production decisions in the 
planting period (August 1997) they consider shocks ( 2s ) that were realized during the 
preceding preharvest (April to June 1997) and harvest (July 1997) period. On-farm 
labor allocation for the preharvest period of season 2 (September to December 1997) 
are made by the household taking into account shocks ( 2s , 3s ) experienced during the 
previous season preharvest and harvest (April to July 1997) as well as early season 
planting (August 1997) periods. Decisions made by the household in season 3 follows 
the process described for season 1 and 2. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
5.1 The Household Crop Production Model 
In Akwapim South, households use land, labor and very small amounts of chemical 
inputs in maize production. I assume that acreage decisions are made before the 
beginning of the season while labor allocation decisions are made during the season. 
During the season, the household experiences both idiosyncratic and covariate shocks 
that affect total household production. Due to the similarities in covariate shocks such 
as weather, and prices experienced by households, only estimates of the effects of 
idiosyncratic shocks on crop yield can be identified. In this study, I assume that 
unobserved idiosyncratic shocks are exogenous, independent and identically 
distributed and jointly normal with zero mean and variances (Fafchamps, 1993).  
Labor is allocated sequentially during the season as expected shocks and other 
information relevant to labor allocation are revealed to the household. We also assume 
that households have identical crop production technologies and responses to covariate 
shocks.  
 I estimate the household maize production technology using a generalized 
quadratic functional form. The quadratic functional form was chosen due to the 
occurrence of zero labor allocation after aggregation of the data. Therefore, we 
express the household’s crop production technology for maize as: 
 (26) ijtijtijtijtfijtfijtfijtfijtfijtfijt Wsslllllly 081706215
2
2423
2
121102 βββββββββ +++⋅+++++=   
ijtiijt uHW +++ ψβ
2
09  
ijtijijt eu += π  
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where i  refers to household, j  plot and t  season; H denote vectors of seasonal 
dummies, village and other household covariates which may affect crop production; iπ  
is the unobserved household plot-specific, time-invariant effect and ijte  is the 
independent and identically distributed (iid), normally distributed unexplained portion 
of the random error with zero mean.  
 The stochastic structure of the household crop production technology is: 
( )INe ijtijt 2,0~ σ  
( ) 0, =τijijt eeE    where τ≠t  
( ) 0, =ijtkjt eeE   where ik ≠  
( ) 0=′XE iπ   where ( )ijtijtijtijtfijtf ssWllX 10021 ,,,,=  
This specification allows the error term ijte to be heteroscedastic due to the relationship 
between traditional inputs and the probability distribution of crop yields (Appelbaum 
and Ullah, 1997; Just and Pope, 1979; Kumbhakar and Tveteras, 2003; Love and 
Buccola, 1991). Consequently, production technology parameters estimated using 
ordinary regression techniques in the presence of heteroscedasticity are consistent but 
inefficient. I solve the problem by using a weighted panel regression in a Just-Pope 
framework to correct for heteroscedasticity.14
                                                 
14 This is similar to a weighted least square regression except that panel regression techniques are used 
instead of ordinary least square estimation.  
 I use both random and fixed effects 
panel estimators. The results for the two methods are compared using Hausman’s 
specification test. The elasticities of labor inputs are also compared. Using a panel 
regression approach has the benefit of helping us understand the role played by labor 
in the household crop production process as well as its effects on yield risk while 
controlling for unobserved household level differences in ability, outside employment 
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options and plot level differences in time-invariant biophysical characteristics such as 
slope, distance from homestead, access to water, soil type, etc. I am also able to 
explore the importance of the timing of the occurrence of shocks in the household 
production process.  We can rewrite the maize yield function in a Just-Pope form as: 
(27) ( ) ( )επ HXhHXfy i ,, 2
1
2 ++=  
where ( ) ( )εε HXheE ijt ,;0 2
1
==  
The first term represent the deterministic component of the household maize yield 
function while the last term represents the stochastic component. I correct for 
heteroscedasticity by dividing each term in regression equation (27) by ( )HXh ,2
1
 
resulting in the expression: 
(28) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) επ ++= −−− HXhHXhHXfHXhy i ,,,, 2
1
2
1
2
1
2  
In an approach similar to that used by Just and Pope, I estimate equation (28) using a 
weighted panel regression by following the steps below: 
(a) Estimate equation (26) using a panel regression to obtain estimates of the 
parameters of the crop production function. Use the estimates to generate 
residuals ijteˆ . 
(b) Regress the square of residuals 2ˆijte  from (a) on all the independent variable 
( X , H ) and use the estimates to obtain ( )HXh ,ˆ .15
(c) Divide each term of the original regression equation by
 
( )HXh ,ˆ 2
1
. Estimate 
equation (28) by regressing ( )HXhy ,ˆ 2
1
−
 on all the independent variables 
divided by ( )HXh ,ˆ 2
1
.  
                                                 
15 This is based on the relationship ( ) ( ) ( )HXhHXhEeE it ,ˆ),(ˆˆ 22 == ε . The next section further discusses 
this and how to use the Just-Pope method to obtain ex ante yield risk. Note that ( )Xhˆ  denotes the 
estimate of ( )Xh . 
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 The estimates resulting from the above econometric procedure are consistent, 
unbiased and asymptotically efficient. In this paper, I proceed a step further by 
repeating the above procedure until the standard errors of the coefficients of the 
regression converge.16
( )εHXh ,2
1
 This is because we don’t know the true functional form 
of . In the next section, I use the first two steps of the above econometric 
procedure to estimate risk and also explore the effect of on-farm labor allocation on 
risk.   
 
 
 
5.2 Just-Pope Method for Estimating Yield Risk 
In this paper, I use the conditional yield variance as a measure of the yield risk faced 
by households in the crop production process. I estimate two types of risk: ex ante 
yield risk and ex post yield risk. The conditional variance of yield is estimated using 
the Just-Pope method just described. According to Just and Pope (1979), by specifying 
the crop production function as in (27), where mean yield, ( ) ( )HXfyE ,=  and 
variance of yield, ( ) ( )HXhyv y ,2 ==σ  the effects of inputs on mean and variance of 
yield can be independent. Therefore the marginal effect of labor on variance and crop 
output are not determined a priori.  
 The estimation procedure for the conditional variance of maize yield based on 
Just and Pope (1979) is described below. Let’s rewrite the Just-Pope yield function 
more compactly as: 
(29) ( ) ( )αεδυ ;,;,2
1
HXfyHXh −==  
                                                 
16 Refer to section D.1 of Appendix D for details of this iterative procedure for correcting 
heteroscedasticity as well as its basis. 
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where α  and δ  represent the coefficients of the deterministic and stochastic 
components of the crop production function, respectively. Since the estimates of the 
parameters of the household crop production technology αˆ  and δˆ  are consistent, ∗υ  
consistently estimates the stochastic component of the technology. We obtain: 
(30) ( ) ( )αεδυ ˆ;,ˆˆ;,ˆ 2
1
HXfyHXh −==∗  
Taking expectations after squaring ∗υ : 
(31)  ( ){ } ( ){ } ( )δεδσυ ˆ;,ˆˆ;,ˆˆ 222 HXhHXhEE y ===∗  
Based on the works of Just and Pope as well as Hildreth and Houck, the expression in 
(31) can be used in a regression equation as follows: 
(32)       ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ωδωυυ +=+=∗ ∗ ˆ;,ˆ22 HXhE c  
where ( ) 0=ωE  by definition of expectations. ω  represents all random exogenous 
shocks which occur during the season which are assumed to be independently 
distributed with zero mean (Kumbhakar and Tveteras, 2003).  Therefore we can get 
estimates αˆ  and δˆ  by regressing ( )2∗υ  on all their corresponding independent 
variables using a linear functional form to approximate the conditional yield variance 
or yield risk function.17
             As demonstrated by Just and Pope (1979), 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) 22 ˆˆ;,ˆˆ yHXhyV συδ =∗==  
which represents the yield risk faced by the household. Therefore, δˆ  represent the 
coefficients which reflect the risk effect of on-farm labor allocated by the household to 
maize production. This is similar to using a weighted least squares regression to 
                                                 
17 Kumbhakar and Tveteras, (2003) used a Just-Pope production function ( ) ( )εXgXfy +=  to develop an 
output risk function of the form ( )Xg . They describeε as a stochastic term which represents random 
production shocks. 
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estimate the stochastic (variance) component of yield (Griffiths and Anderson, 198218
 
; 
Just and Pope, 1979). Note that ordinary least square estimation is used for the second 
step of the procedure. By using panel regression techniques for the first stage, I am 
able to isolate the unexplained portion of random error. 
 
 
5.3 Application of the Just-Pope Method in the Estimation of Yield Risk 
In this thesis, I assume acreage decisions are made before the beginning of the season. 
When the household is making a decision on labor allocation per acre, they take into 
account their knowledge of yield risk at that time of the season. During the planting 
period, the household determines ex ante yield risk using information on shocks they 
experienced during the previous (preharvest and harvest) periods. Ex post risk is 
determined in the same way; however, the household updates its knowledge using 
information on shocks from the planting period of the current season. I use the Just-
Pope method described in the previous section to estimate ex ante and ex post yield 
risk. In the estimation of yield risk, seasonal observations are pooled to take advantage 
of identification resulting from inter-seasonal, intra-household, plot-level, and cross-
sectional variations among maize plots.19
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18In their paper, Griffiths et al. (1982) specified the stochastic component of production as 
heteroscedastic. A similar specification is used in this paper. 
19 Refer to Appendix E for description of the estimation of ex ante and ex post yield risk. 
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The regression equation for estimating ex ante yield risk is written as:  
(33)   ( ) 0;032020101 =++++++= ijtijtijijtijtijtijt EHsWWV ϑϑρφθθθθ  
where ijtV1  represents household conditional yield variance of maize in the planting 
period; ijρ is the household- and plot-specific time invariant effect; and ijtϑ is the 
random error term. I assume the yield risk function is general quadratic functional 
form. The regression equation for estimating ex post yield risk is written as:  
(34)   ( ) 0;14032020102 =+++++++= ijtijtijijtijtijtijtijt EHssWWV κκςϕϖϖϖϖϖ  
where ijtV2  represents household subjective variance of maize yield in the preharvest 
period; ijς is the household- and plot-specific time invariant effect; and ijtκ is the 
random error term. I assume the risk function is quadratic in initial wealth. 
           I estimate equations (33) and (34) using both fixed and random effect 
regression method. I then compare the results of the two methods using a Hausman’s 
test. The selected models are used to estimate the ex ante and ex post yield risk of the 
household. These estimated values ( ijtV1ˆ  and ijtV2ˆ ) are plugged into the household 
labor allocation model as estimators of household-plot- and season-specific yield risk. 
The estimation procedure for the household labor allocation model is described in the 
next section. 
 
 
5.4 Specification and Estimation of Labor Allocation 
I assume that the only risk the household deals with in their crop production is yield 
risk. I further assume that output price, hired labor wage rate, and input prices are 
known with certainty and all households face similar prices. These are reasonable 
assumptions given the proximity of the survey villages. Using equations (22) to (25) 
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from the optimization problem and appending optimization errors (Chavas et al., 
1996; Saha et al., 1994) to them, the household optimal on-farm labor allocation 
system can be specified as: 
(35)  112161514
2
03020101
lf
ijt
lf
iijtijtijtijtijtijtf HIIVWWsl εµηωωωωωωω +++++++++=  
(36) 112161514
2
03020101
lw
ijt
lw
iijtijtijtijtijtijtijtw HIIVWWsl εµξτττττττ +++++++++=  
(37) +++++++++++= 2210
2
19281726
2
05041302102 ijtijtijtijtijtijtijtijtijtijtf IIIIVWWssll γγγγγγγγγγγ  
22 lf
ijt
lf
ijtH εµχ ++  
(38) +++++++++++= 2210
2
19281726
2
05041302102 ijtijtijtijtijtijtijtijtijtw IIIIVWWssll ψψψψψψψψψψψ  
22 lw
ijt
lw
iH εµϕ ++  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 02211 ==== lfijtlwijtlfijtlwijt EEEE εεεε ; ( )ijtwijtf lll 11 ˆ,ˆ=  
where 1lwiµ ,
1lf
iµ ,
2lw
iµ and
2lf
iµ denote unobserved household-specific time-invariant 
effects for each model. 0I denotes household exogenous income for the previous pre-
harvest period and 1I  is income for the current (planting) period. Predicted values of 
prior period labor allocation ( )ijtwijtf lll 11 ˆ,ˆ=  for the planting period are used in 
regression equation  (37) and (38) for the subsequent preharvest period instead of 
actually values; the error terms in  (37) and (38) are likely to be correlated with 
planting period labor allocations. When the household makes labor allocation in the 
preharvest period, their decision is influenced by errors in allocation from the planting 
period. As a result, errors in planting period labor allocation regression equations are 
correlated with their corresponding equations for the preharvest period. Estimating the 
first two regressions and using them to predict the planting period labor allocation 
removes these errors.  
 Equations (35) to (38) are estimated independently using fixed and random 
effects regression techniques. This involves estimating the first two regression 
equations representing households ex ante labor decision rules and using them to 
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obtaining linear predictions for labor allocation which are then plugged into the last 
two equations before they are estimated. The error terms are independent across 
equations and the regressors are identical within period; therefore joint estimation does 
not improve efficiency of estimates. The errors terms are likely to be heteroscedastic 
since households differ in their ability to optimally allocate labor to crop production 
and the labor market. I correct for heteroscedasticity using the procedure described in 
section 5.1.  
 Another issue is omitted variables due to lack of consumption and labor 
availability data by period: 1C , 2C , 1C , 2C , 1L , 2L , 1L , 2L  and other household covariates 
(e.g., number of household members, soil fertility, cropping system, planting date, 
quality of labor) are missing in regression equations (35) to (38). Most households do 
not have observations for certain types of idiosyncratic shocks (Table 4.4) for some 
rounds and are dropped from the analysis. Hence, the effects of certain types of 
idiosyncratic shocks are considered for only one of the two periods. The lack of data 
on shocks might be as a result of missing data or simply the failure of households to 
report incidence of certain types of shocks. Consequently, estimates of the model 
might be inaccurate due to omitted variable bias. However, the use of panel regression 
techniques reduces this bias substantially. Most of the bias is picked up by the 
estimated fixed or random effects.  
 Labor is aggregated into periods but I am not able to take into account planting 
date due to lack of data on planting dates. Variation in planting date and calendar for 
other on-farm activities can lead to the problem of measurement errors which also bias 
coefficient estimates. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The results can be divided into three groups: household yield, conditional yield 
variance, and labor allocation.  I first examine the household yield function estimated 
using random effects regression with corrections for heteroscedasticity and cluster 
effects.20
 
 Estimates of elasticity and marginal physical products of labor allocation in 
the planting and preharvest periods are examined. This is followed by the discussion 
of the household conditional yield variance function and marginal yield risk effects of 
labor and initial wealth. Finally, I use the estimated household labor allocation models 
to analyze the ex ante and ex post effects of idiosyncratic shocks and risk. 
 
 
6.1 Household Crop Production Technology 
Table 6.1 presents the results of the estimation of the household maize yield function. 
Estimates of fixed and random effects are reported for comparison. Comparing the 
estimates of random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) model, it is evident that the 
estimates differ in magnitude and even signs. Under the FE model, the estimated 
coefficients for planting and preharvest period labor are negative with preharvest labor 
statistically significant at a 5% level. The overall R-square value for random effects is 
higher than the one for the fixed effects model. The random effects estimates are 
                                                 
20 Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects. The within-individual cluster effect results from the 
household cultivating the same plot from one season to another. The three seasons captured by the data 
set are adjoined to one another (see Appendix A for details).  
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consistent since unobserved household plot-specific time-invariant effects are likely to 
be uncorrelated with included variables. Therefore, I focus on the random effects 
estimates in my discussion of the results. The fraction of variation (Rho) explained by 
individual effects is high for both models. In addition to the above comparisons, I 
consider the marginal physical products (MPP) and elasticities for labor and initial 
wealth at the means of the sample (reported in Table 6.2)21
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Check section F.1 of Appendix F for details on the MPP and elasticities of selected variables. 
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Table 6.1—Household Maize Yield Function 
 
Variables 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
On-farm Labor Allocation   
Planting period labor (days/acre) 2.489*** -0.00171 
 (0.594) (1.363) 
Square of planting period labor (days/acre)2 0.0162 0.0460 
 (0.0501) (0.0345) 
Preharvest period labor (days/acre) 2.636*** -2.037** 
 (0.991) (0.857) 
Square of preharvest period labor (days/acre)2 -0.00217 0.00605 
 (0.0174) (0.0262) 
Planting labor × preharvest labor  (days/acre)2    -0.0752 0.0705 
 (0.0951) (0.0775) 
Village and Seasonal Dummies   
Darmang  40.51**  
 (17.80)  
Pokrom -15.54  
 (18.49)  
Oboadaka 19.25  
 (11.92)  
Season 1 (March 1996 to July 1997) -14.23 -4.384 
 (12.24) (18.66) 
Season 2 (August 1997 to January 1998) -38.49*** -12.54 
 (13.59) (17.18) 
Idiosyncratic Shocks (Dummy Variables)   
Damage to stored crops in planting period -45.07** 0.0325 
 (21.65) (24.99) 
Damage to other crops in planting period  16.33 5.871 
 (15.97) (22.45) 
Negative health events in previous preharvest and harvest period 5.332 5.896 
 (6.902) (5.949) 
Negative health events in planting period 6.080 5.574 
 (6.190) (10.50) 
Unexpected expenses in planting period -45.98** -71.93*** 
 (20.66) (15.53) 
Household Characteristics   
Occupation (1 if household head is farmer, 0 if otherwise) 35.73*  
 (20.38)  
Education (1 if household head had some schooling, 0 if otherwise) 6.387  
 (15.46)  
Age of household head -0.603  
 (1.194)  
Square of age of household head 0.00241  
 (0.0155)  
Initial wealth × 1,000,000 (¢) 11.9 9.15 
 (9.08) (6.47) 
Square of initial wealth × 1013  (¢)2 -5.18 -5.08 
 (4.36) (4.40) 
Constant 4.578** 11.95*** 
 (1.923) (1.404) 
   
Observations 269 269 
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Table 6.1 (Continued)   
 
 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
R-squared (before heteroscedasticity correction)   
Within 0.3367 0.7619 
Between 0.2149                                         0.0018
Overall 0.2111          0.0024 
Rho (fraction of variance due to individual effects u_i) 0.9366 0.9765 
Number of pid 238 238 
Joint Wald Test of Hypothesis (Prob>chi2)   
Idiosyncratic shocks  0.3216 0.4687 
Initial wealth and square of wealth 0.1889 0.1585 
        Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for cluster effects and corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using the iterative correction procedure described in section D.1 of Appendix D. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
              
             The estimates of marginal physical product (MPP) for the RE model are also 
more reasonable than those for the FE model; the MPP for preharvest planting labor 
(at the sample mean) estimated under fixed effects is negative. As discussed earlier, 
the mean age of household heads is about 43 years and 90% of them are farmers. 
Consequently, one would expect elasticities between 0 and 1 since most farmers are 
very experienced and know how to grow maize properly. This suggests crop 
production by these households might be taking place in stage 2 of a classical 
production function. In terms of yield, on-farm labor allocation decisions during the 
preharvest period are slightly (but not statistically significant) greater than planting 
period on-farm labor.  
 
Table 6.2—Estimated Marginal Physical Productivity and Elasticity for Maize Yield 
  
Marginal Physical 
Product Elasticity 
Variable  
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Planting period labor (days/acre) 1.73 1.43 0.15 1.01 
Preharvest period labor (days/acre) 2.14 -1.47 0.38 -2.19 
Initial household wealth × 10,000 (¢) 0.10 0.07 0.24 1.49 
  Notes: Marginal physical product ixyMPP ∂∂= . Elasticity ( )yxxyE iii ⋅∂∂=  is evaluated at the means  
of independent variables. 
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 Both the random and fixed effects MPP estimates of initial household wealth at 
the means are extremely low; however, they have reasonable elasticity values with 
respect to initial household wealth (Table 6.2). Initial household wealth has an 
estimated elasticity of 0.244 for random effects and 1.48 for fixed effects. From Table 
6.1, initial household wealth does not significantly influence maize yields. The 
implication is that ceteris paribus richer households do not enjoy higher maize yields 
compared to their poorer counterparts. Table 6.1 reports the p-value (0.189) of the 
joint significant test of initial wealth and its square. So we reject the hypothesis that 
self-insurance capacity proxied by wealth affects maize yields.  
 From the random effects estimates in Table 6.1, planting and preharvest period 
labor positively influence maize yields and are significant at the 1% level. The 
interaction term between planting and preharvest period labor does not significantly 
affect yield and has a negative sign. The negative sign indicates planting and 
preharvest period labor are technically substitutes.  
 The village level dummies in Table 6.1 encompass village characteristics that 
can potentially affect yield. These village characteristics include access to extension 
services, farming tools, topography, soil fertility and other unobservable variables. 
The dummy variable for Darmang has a large positive coefficient and is significant at 
the 5% level. One possible reason is that among all the villages, Darmang is the 
closest to the district capital, Nsawam. The coefficient for Darmang is 40.51 kg/acre. 
The dummy variable for season 2 also has a large significant effect on yield.  
Maize yield in season 2 are about 40 kg/acre higher on average than maize yields in 
other seasons. This is difficult to interpret since the data do not contain information on 
weather and events which can potentially influence yields.   
 The coefficients for damage to stored crops and unexpected expenses in the 
planting period of the current season are statistically significantly (at the 5% level) 
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different from zero. They have very strong negative effects as compared to labor and 
other variables which have significant effects on yield. Damage to stored crops in the 
planting period has a coefficient of -45.07 kg/acre while unexpected expenses in the 
planting period have a coefficient of -45.98 kg/acre. The mean yield for households in 
the sample is about 75 kg/acre.22
 In rural areas such as Akwapim South, sources of unexpected expenses include 
funerals and other social obligations, and unexpected increase in the cost of farm 
implements. When households incur unexpected expenses, it is likely to be 
accompanied by a decrease in consumption, use of inferior farm tools and other 
actions which can directly impact the productivity of labor. Behrman et al. (1997) 
found evidence of small productivity effects of caloric consumption in the planting 
stage that is realized in the harvest stage. Estimated coefficients for damage to other 
crops in the planting period, and negative health events in the planting and preharvest 
periods are not significantly different from zero. A joint test
 Hence, when idiosyncratic shocks occur they have 
the potential of drastically reducing maize yields. The statistically significant effects 
of damage to stored crops and unexpected expenses in the planting period may be 
attributed to their direct effects on the household’s stock of planting materials and cash 
budget, respectively. Unexpected expenses decrease the amount available for crop 
production while damage to stored crops (which is largely maize) decreases the 
household’s stock of planting materials. Due to its long shelf life, maize is stored to be 
later used by the household for food and planting materials. Hence unexpected 
expenses and damage to stored crops in the planting period reduces the labor quality 
which in turn reduces crop yields. 
23
                                                 
22 Table B.1 of Appendix B contains descriptive statistics for important variables used in the analysis. 
 of the effect of all the 
idiosyncratic shocks on yield failed to reject the null hypothesis that idiosyncratic 
23 Check section G.2 of Appendix G for details of the results of the Wald test. 
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shocks do not collectively affect yield; the p-value of the Wald test statistic is 0.3216. 
In general, the yield effect of an idiosyncratic shock depends on the type and the 
period in which the shock occurred.   
 From the RE model, most of the household variables do not significantly affect 
yield except for occupation (1 if household head is a farmer and 0 if otherwise) which 
is statistically significant (at the 10% level), with coefficient estimates of 35.58 
kg/acre. The magnitude of the coefficient likely shows that technical knowledge of 
maize production has a very strong effect on yield. They are able to make better 
decisions with regards to timing of weeding, planting distance, land preparation, 
selection of suitable locations for farming, and other important factors in maize 
production. The dummy variable for whether the household head has ever been to 
school (education) has a positive effect on yield but is not significant. This is 
surprising since education typically improves the managerial ability of farmers making 
it easier for them to process information and reach good decisions.  
 Age of the household head, apart from being a proxy for experience, also 
represents other unobservables such as aversion to new technologies or techniques, 
ability to closely supervise farm work and other relevant characteristics which may be 
related to age. This may partly explain the confounding effects of age on yield which 
is negative and does not have a significant effect. It is expected that since most 
household heads are farmers with an average age of 43 years, age is a good proxy for 
experience and as a result should have a positive effect on yield; however, in this case 
age has a negative effect. 
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6.2 The Household Conditional Maize Yield Variance Function 
The estimates of the coefficients of the household conditional yield variance function 
are reported in Table 6.3. The Breusch-Pagan test24 for heteroscedasticity reveals that 
errors are heteroscedastic (p-value is less than 0.001). I correct for heteroscedasticity 
using iterative correction previously described. For the purpose of comparison, 
heteroscedasticity is also corrected using the White’s correction.25
 
 The results of the 
method are reported in Table 6.3. The estimated coefficients are used for estimating 
marginal risk effects and elasticites for labor and initial wealth at the means of the 
sample. The results are reported in Table 6.4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Check section G.3 of Appendix G for results of the Breusch-Pagan Test. 
25 Refer to Table E.5 of Appendix E for estimates of both the iterative and Huber-White correction. 
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Table 6.3—Estimation of Conditional Yield Variance for Maize 
Variables Iterative Correction 
On-farm Labor Allocation  
Planting period labor (days/acre) 18.37*** 
 (2.241) 
Square of planting period labor (days/acre)2 -0.0259 
 (0.0630) 
Preharvest period labor (days/acre) 0.538 
 (2.201) 
Square of preharvest period labor (days/acre)2 0.0182 
 (0.0261) 
     Planting labor × preharvest labor (days/acre)2 -0.233* 
 (0.133) 
Village and Seasonal Dummies  
Darmang  145.6*** 
 (53.10) 
Pokrom 5.664 
 (50.62) 
Oboadaka 23.55 
 (41.59) 
Season 1 (March 96 to July 97) 186.7*** 
 (59.89) 
Season 2 (August 97 to January 98) 66.42 
 (63.93) 
Idiosyncratic Shocks (Dummy Variables)  
Damage to stored crops in planting period -23.13 
 (113.8) 
Damage to other crops in planting period  3.960 
 (84.84) 
Negative health events in previous season 70.83* 
 (38.32) 
Negative health events in planting period 32.53 
 (41.71) 
Unexpected expenses in planting period 76.46 
 (116.1) 
Household Characteristics  
Occupation (1 if head is farmer, 0 if otherwise) -22.79 
 (52.80) 
Education (1 if head had some schooling, 0 otherwise) 0.771 
 (41.06) 
Age of household head -3.405 
 (3.925) 
Square of age of household head -0.0179 
 (0.0461) 
Initial wealth× 100,000 (¢) 7.57*** 
 (2.22) 
Square of initial wealth × 1,000,000,000 (¢)2 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
Constant -0.0891 
 (0.0674) 
R-squared 0.104 
Joint Test of Idiosyncratic Shocks (Prob > F) 0.47 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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               According to Table 6.4, the marginal risk effect and elasticity of initial 
wealth for both estimation methods are similar. The risk effect of initial wealth is very 
weak; however its elasticity is higher than that for labor. The coefficient for the square 
of initial wealth is negative for both methods; this indicates that households with 
initial wealth greater than a critical value (¢10,939,306) can benefit from a very weak 
risk-decreasing effect of initial wealth.26 In other words, the marginal effect of initial 
wealth on risk is negative for relatively richer households in the sample and positive 
for poor ones (with initial wealth less than ¢10,939,306). Only 7 households in the 
subsample have wealth beyond this level.27
           The estimates for the marginal risk effects of labor under iterative correction 
seem reasonable. Since the preharvest period is longer than the planting period, 
farmers have more opportunities to update their production decisions, thus giving 
them more control over the production process. Based on the estimates under iterative 
correction at the mean of the sample, planting period labor allocation is risk-increasing 
while preharvest period labor has a risk-decreasing effect. The significant effect of 
labor on yield variance is consistent with the finding by Antle (1983) that the first 
three moments—this thesis focuses on only the first two—of output is a statistically 
significant function of inputs.  
 The positive marginal effect of initial 
household wealth on yield risk for most households in the sample (94%) indicates that 
wealthier households face higher yield risk compared to poor ones. This is likely to be 
as a result of wealthier households engaging in other activities that distract them from 
maize production culminating in higher yield risk.  
 
 
                                                 
26 This can be obtained by simply solving for the value of initial wealth that satisfies the 
condition: ( ) ( ) 10939306
103.462
107.570103.462107.57 12-
-5
00
12-5-
0
2 =
××
×
>⇒<⋅×⋅−×=∂∂ WWWσ  
27 Refer to Figure B.5 of Appendix B. 
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Table 6.4—Estimated Marginal Risk Effects and Elasticities for Labor and Initial 
Household Wealth  
The coefficient for planting period labor (18.37) is significant (at 1% level). This may 
be attributed to the fact that there is a positive relationship between planting labor 
allocated per acre and the number of maize plants per acre (closer planting distance). 
Therefore, the more maize planted per acre, the more risk faced by the household. The 
closer the planting distance, the more vulnerable plants are to diseases, and other plot-
specific shocks.  Planting and preharvest period labor interact to have a negative effect 
on yield risk. The interaction term for planting and preharvest period labor is negative 
and significant (at 10% level). Therefore, the coefficients for the interaction term, 
planting period labor and its square can have a combined negative effect for some 
combinations of planting and preharvest labor.  
 There is evidence of seasonal and village effects on yield risk. The dummy 
variables for Darmang and season 1 both have a significant positive effect on yield 
risk (at 1% level). Under iterative correction, the value of the coefficient for Darmang 
is 145.6 and 186.7 for season 1. These two variables have the strongest effects on 
yield risk. This suggests location and time are very important when considering yield 
risk faced by different households. All the coefficients for village and seasonal 
dummies estimated using iterative correction have positive effects on yield risk. 
 Certain types of idiosyncratic shocks are expected to have positive effects on 
yield risk. Only negative health events in previous preharvest and harvest period have 
a significant effect on yield risk. The coefficient has a value of 70.83 and is significant 
at the 10% level. All the other idiosyncratic shocks do not significantly affect yield 
risk. I test the hypothesis that idiosyncratic shocks have a joint effect on yield risk 
  Marginal Risk Effect Elasticity 
Variable  White Iterative White Iterative 
Planting period labor (days/acre) 4.19 15.12 0.18 0.53 
Preharvest period labor (days/acre) 4.80 -0.38 0.44 -0.03 
Initial household wealth  × 10,000 (¢)  0.05 0.06 0.67 0.64 
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using a Wald test.28
 The other variables representing household characteristics (except education) 
have the expected signs but do not statistically significantly affect yield risk. Both age 
and occupation have negative effects. I argue that age is a good proxy for many 
characteristics including experience while occupation is a good proxy for farming 
ability. In effect, households whose heads are farmers ceteris paribus should face less 
yield risk than those with heads who are not farmers. Older household heads are less 
likely to experiment with new technologies (e.g., new varieties, organic fertilizers) 
than younger ones and this reduces the households’ exposure to risk by reducing the 
probability of change in yield. Education is a special case since it is known to improve 
the managerial ability of farmers. However, it gives the household head more 
employment opportunities which can divert their attention and consequently reduce 
the quality of labor. The possibility of divided attention can lead to an increase in the 
variation of yield. This is consistent with Barrett et al. (2006) finding that secondary 
education has a negative influence on technical efficiency among West African rice 
farmers.  
 The p-value of the test statistic is greater than 0.05; I therefore 
conclude that idiosyncratic shocks do not collectively influence yield risk faced by the 
households (Table 6.3). The dummy variable representing unexpected expenses 
incurred during the planting period has the largest coefficients but it is not significant 
even at the 10% level. The effects of idiosyncratic shocks on yield risk suggest the 
presence of alternative mechanisms which mask the risk effects of idiosyncratic 
shocks. The significant effect of negative health events in the preharvest and harvest 
period of the previous season means either mechanism adopted by household do not 
effectively deal with negative health events or they simply do not have mechanisms 
for dealing with negative health events. 
                                                 
28 Refer to section G.2 of Appendix G for test statistics for the Wald test.  
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6.3 The Household Labor Allocation Model for Planting and Preharvest Periods 
Regression equations (35) to (38) represent the household labor allocation model for 
the planting and preharvest period. These are estimated independently using random 
effects regression techniques. Estimates of the coefficients for the household labor 
allocation model for the planting period (ex ante) are reported in Table 6.5. The results 
of the estimation of the household labor allocation model for the preharvest period (ex 
post) are reported in Table 6.7.  Using the results of the ex ante and ex post labor 
allocation model, I test the hypotheses regarding labor allocation posited at the end of 
the section 3.1.29
 
 Estimates of the marginal effects and elasticities of selected variables 
at the sample means are reported in Table 6.6 and 6.8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Refer to section G.2 of Appendix G for the test statistic of the Wald Test. 
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Table 6.5—Household Labor Allocation Model for Planting Period  
Variables On-Farm Labor Non-Farm Labor 
Farm Characteristics   
Percentage of acreage in maize -28.26** -33.26 
 (14.31) (23.99) 
Square of percentage in acreage 23.06* 28.92 
 (12.96) (18.63) 
Idiosyncratic Shocks and Ex ante Yield Risk    
Negative health events in previous season 0.341 -0.374 
 (2.334) (1.714) 
Standard deviation of yield  -0.549 0.645 
 (0.651) (0.698) 
Village and Seasonal Dummies   
Darmang 2.980 4.833 
 (3.988) (3.557) 
Pokrom 2.117 38.30 
 (3.423) (24.77) 
Oboadaka -0.582 -2.441 
 (1.915) (4.003) 
Season 1 (March 96 to July 97) -9.080*** -6.929** 
 (3.524) (3.485) 
Season 2 (August 97 to January 98) -9.354 -3.670 
 (6.610) (6.724) 
Household Characteristics   
Planting period income × 1,000,000 (¢) -1.23 7.36 
 (1.51) (4.81) 
Square of planting period income × 1012 (¢) 0.10 -0.96 
 (0.12) (0.62) 
Occupation of household head 2.084 5.602 
 (1.818) (3.990) 
Education of household head 1.238 0.161 
 (2.851) (3.911) 
Age of household head 0.0366 -0.110 
 (0.0862) (0.146) 
Initial household wealth × 1,000,000 (¢) 0.76 -0.78 
 (1.06) (2.34) 
Square of initial household wealth × 1012 (¢) -0.026    0.17 
 (0.054) (0.23) 
Constant 19.22* 2.806 
 (10.76) (16.02) 
   
Observations 268 268 
R-squared   
Joint Wald Test of Hypothesis (Prob>chi2)   
Initial wealth and square of wealth 0.47 0.74 
Number of pid 237 237 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 In the household labor allocation model, the percentage of household acreage 
in maize is used to control for the importance of maize to the household as a source of 
food or income. According to Table 6.5, the percentage of household acreage in maize 
has a significant negative effect on on-farm labor allocation at the 5% level while its 
square has a significant positive effect. At the means of the sample, the marginal effect 
of percentage of acreage in maize on on-farm labor allocation is positive as expected. 
As the percentage of household acreage in maize increases, they allocate more labor to 
maize per acre. Beyond 61%, the percentage of acreage in maize has a negative effect 
on on-farm labor allocation. In the case of non-farm labor allocation, the percentage of 
household acreage in maize is not statistically significant. The average percentage of 
household acreage in maize is about 73%.30
 For on-farm labor allocation, the signs of the coefficient for negative health 
event and measure of ex ante yield risk are positive and negative, respectively, but 
neither is statistically significant. The negative sign of the effect of ex ante yield risk 
on on-farm labor allocation is in support of the negative effect of risk on input 
allocation and the traditional assumption that smallholder households are risk averse. 
However, the effect of ex ante yield risk on on-farm labor allocation is not significant 
at even the 10% level. Therefore the hypothesized effect of ex ante yield risk on on-
farm labor allocation is not confirmed.  
  
 The situation is different for non-farm labor allocation which is negatively 
influenced by negative health events but positively by ex ante yield risk, albeit 
insignificantly. This finding indicates that the households in the sample do not 
necessarily increase their participation in the labor market and other non-farm 
activities in response to an increase in ex ante yield risk. This suggests households do 
                                                 
30 Refer to Figure B.4 of Appendix B for the distribution of the percentage of household acreage in 
maize. 
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not consider the wage labor market and other income generating activities as less risky 
compared to farming. Since ex ante yield risk does not significantly affect non-farm 
labor, the hypothesis that non-farm labor responds positively to ex ante yield risk is 
not confirmed. Another possible explanation is that they cannot easily increase their 
off-farm employment due to limited market demand. In contrast to on-farm labor, the 
effect of negative health events experienced by the household on non-farm labor 
allocation is negative, likely reflecting loss of household labor supply to illness and 
the prioritization of on-farm work over off-farm employment. 
 In general, the statistical insignificance of the effect of yield risk and shocks on 
planting period labor allocation is consistent with the earlier finding that households 
have alternative mechanisms for dealing with yield risk and shocks. Therefore, 
household labor allocation does not respond radically to incidence of shocks and ex 
ante yield risk. 
  The village and seasonal dummies control for unobservable characteristics and 
other omitted variables. The effect of season 1 on on-farm labor allocation is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. Season 2 and all the village dummies have 
insignificant effects on on-farm labor. Non-farm labor is negatively influenced by the 
season 1 dummy variable and is significant at the 5% level. The remaining village and 
seasonal dummy variables do not significantly influence non-farm labor allocation.  
 The other household characteristics do not have significant effects on on-farm 
labor allocation intensity. The occupation of the household head has a positive effect 
on on-farm labor allocation as expected. Household heads who are farmers are 
expected to allocate more labor per acre than those who are not. This makes intuitive 
sense since heads who are farmers are more likely to devote more attention to crop 
production in order to guarantee good yields. The insignificant effect of occupation 
can be explained by the fact that 90% of the sample consist of maize farmers. As 
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reported in Table 6.6, planting period exogenous income has a minute marginal effect 
on on-farm labor allocation. The remaining variables for household characteristics do 
not have significant effects on non-farm labor.  
 
Table 6.6—Estimated Marginal Effects and Elasticities of Selected Variables on Ex 
ante Labor Allocation 
  Marginal Effects Elasticities 
Variable On-farm  Non-farm On-farm  Non-farm 
Percentage of acreage in maize 5.349 8.890 0.052 0.086 
Planting period income × 10,000 (¢) -0.01 0.07 -0.006 0.033 
Initial household wealth × 
10,000(¢) 0.00 0.01 -0.002 0.013 
Note: the above is based on the random effects estimates for the on-farm and non-farm labor allocation 
models.  
  
 To clarify the effect of initial household wealth on labor allocation in the 
planting period, I consider estimates of the marginal effect of wealth on labor followed 
by a test of hypothesis.31
 Table 6.7 reports the estimates of the coefficients of the household labor 
allocation model for the preharvest period (ex post). The estimates of the marginal 
effects and elasticities for the planting period on-farm labor, planting period non-farm 
labor, percentage of acreage in maize, planting and preharvest period exogenous 
incomes are presented in Table 6.8. In the next few paragraphs, I discuss the results of 
the model for on-farm labor allocation followed by non-farm labor allocation. 
 Initial household wealth does not significantly affect both 
non-farm and on-farm labor allocation. This is further confirmed by a test of 
hypothesis of the joint significance of initial wealth and its square. This suggests that 
initial wealth is not important in explaining household ex ante labor allocation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Refer to section G.2 of Appendix G for the test statistics of the Wald Test  
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Table 6.7—Household Labor Allocation Model for Preharvest Period  
Variables On-Farm Labor Non-Farm Labor 
Planting Period Labor Allocation   
Predicted planting period on-farm labor (days/acre) 1.318*** 0.255 
 (0.284) (0.190) 
Square of predicted planting period labor  -0.0102*** -0.00184 
 (0.00318) (0.00180) 
Predicted planting period non-farm labor (days) 0.354*** -0.0247 
 (0.0937) (0.0275) 
Square predicted planting period non-farm labor -1.21e-05 5.45e-05 
 (0.000195) (5.31e-05) 
Percentage of acreage in maize -7.967 -3.009 
 (14.05) (11.52) 
Square of percentage in acreage 4.831 3.129 
 (11.44) (10.79) 
Idiosyncratic Shocks and Risk Measure   
Damage to stored crops in planting period -2.173 -1.111 
 (3.326) (1.257) 
Damage to other crops in planting period  -1.848 -3.294 
 (3.188) (2.422) 
Negative health events in previous season 0.878 1.321 
 (2.020) (2.359) 
Negative health events in planting period -0.965 0.215 
 (1.798) (1.777) 
Unexpected expenses in planting period -1.660 -0.780 
 (2.364) (0.801) 
Standard deviation of yield -0.210 0.0424 
 (0.177) (0.133) 
Village and Seasonal Dummies   
Darmang -2.568 -0.231 
 (2.344) (1.892) 
Pokrom -4.636 -0.225 
 (3.131) (2.256) 
Oboadaka -0.374 2.023 
 (2.494) (1.556) 
Season 1 (March 96 to July 97) 5.731* 0.339 
 (3.113) (1.172) 
Season 2 (August 97 to January 98) 1.997 10.82*** 
 (2.895) (1.978) 
Household Characteristics   
Planting period income × 1,000,000 (¢) -0.89 -0.21 
 (1.34) (0.72) 
Preharvest period income × 1,000,000 (¢) 2.05 -2.30 
 (4.97) (1.56) 
Square of planting period income × 1012 0.19 -0.029 
 (0.24) (0.09) 
Square of preharvest period income × 1012 -1.12    0.70 
 (1.67) (0.54) 
Occupation of household head 1.005 -2.207 
 (2.091) (1.910) 
Education of household head -1.569 2.687 
 (3.073) (1.953) 
Age of household head 0.00275 0.0520 
 (0.0602) (0.0670) 
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Table 6.7 (Continued)   
Variables On-Farm Labor Non-Farm Labor 
   
Initial household wealth × 1,000,000 (¢) -1.30* 0.26 
 (0.74) (0.36) 
Square of initial household wealth × 1012 65.1 -22.9    
 (40.9) (23.1) 
Constant 9.651 -4.516 
 (7.995) (7.021) 
Observations 268 268 
R-squared   
Number of pid 237 237 
Joint Wald Test of Hypothesis (Prob>chi2)   
Idiosyncratic Shocks 0.93 0.55 
Initial wealth and square of wealth 0.08 0.46 
Predicted planting period on-farm labor 0.00 0.36 
Predicted preharvest period non-farm labor 0.00 0.58 
     Standard errors in parentheses 
                  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 Referring to Table 6.8, predicted planting period on-farm labor has a positive 
marginal effect on on-farm labor. A Wald test of the joint significance of planting 
period on-farm labor and its square produces a test statistic with a p-value less than 
0.01.32
 Predicted planting period non-farm labor has a positive marginal effect (at the 
sample mean) on on-farm labor in the preharvest period. Based on the result of a Wald 
test of the joint significant of predicted planting period non-farm labor and its square, I 
 This confirms the hypothesis that planting period on-farm labor allocation has 
a positive influence on on-farm labor allocation in the preharvest period. Hence, when 
the household allocates labor in the preharvest period they take into account how 
much on-farm labor per acre they allocated during the planting period. This means 
farmers probably regard planting and preharvest period on-farm labor as compliments. 
The household has less flexibility with regards crop production than other non-farm 
income activities. Predicted non-farm labor has a significant positive effect at the 1% 
level but its square is negative and insignificant even at 10%.  
                                                 
32 Refer to A.2 of Appendix A for details of the results of the Wald test. 
 74 
 
fail to reject the null hypothesis that predicted planting period non-farm labor has no 
influence on on-farm labor allocation in the preharvest period. The p-value of the test 
statistic is 0.55.33
            When the household makes non-farm labor allocation decisions in the 
preharvest period, does not consider planting period labor allocation. Predicted on-
farm labor allocation during the planting period does not significantly (even at the 
10% level) affect non-farm labor allocation in the preharvest period. The coefficient 
for predicted planting period on-farm labor allocation is positive (0.255 days/acre) 
while its square is positive (-0.002 days/acre). At the mean of the sample, the marginal 
effect of predicted planting period on-farm labor is positive (Table 6.8). A joint test of 
significant is performed and the p-value of the Wald test statistic is 0.36.
  
34
 From the on-farm labor allocation model (Table 6.7), the percentage of 
household acreage in maize does not have a significant effect on labor allocation in the 
preharvest period. As shown in Table 6.8, the marginal effect of the percentage of 
acreage in maize on preharvest on-farm labor allocation is negative for both on-farm 
and non-farm labor allocation. However, the sign of the marginal effect for non-farm 
 This result 
rejects the hypothesis that planting period on-farm labor allocation influences 
preharvest period non-farm labor allocation. The estimated coefficients for predicted 
planting period non-farm labor and its square are not significantly greater than zero. 
At the mean of the sample, the marginal effect of planting period non-farm labor is 
negative. A Wald test of joint significance revealed that non-farm labor allocation and 
its square are insignificant even at the 10% level. This conclusion rejects the 
hypothesized positive marginal effect of planting period non-farm labor on preharvest 
period non-farm labor allocation. 
                                                 
33 Refer to section G.2 of Appendix G for details of the Wald tests. 
34 Refer to section G.2 of Appendix G for details of the Wald tests. 
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labor is opposite that of on-farm labor. This finding is contrary to what one would 
expect as crop production is an important source of income for the household.  
 The importance of idiosyncratic shocks for determining on-farm labor 
allocation is less than expected. None of the idiosyncratic shocks considered in the 
model has a significant effect on on-farm labor. They all negatively affect on-farm 
input allocation except for negative health events experienced by the household in the 
planting period. Damage to stored crops in the planting period has the strongest effect 
on on-farm labor in terms of magnitude. This indicates that damages to stored crops 
can have strong disincentive effects on labor allocation to crop production. However, 
it is difficult to tell what the potential effect of damage to specific crops in storage is 
likely to be. Predictably, ex post yield risk has a negative effect on labor allocation to 
crop production; however, it is not significant. 
 I fail to reject the null hypothesis that ex post yield risk has no effect on on-
farm labor allocation. The negative relationship between ex post yield risk and on-
farm labor allocation in the preharvest period reflects an aversion to yield risk. All the 
idiosyncratic shocks considered do not have a statistically significant effect on non-
farm labor. They all negatively affect non-farm labor allocation except for negative 
health events in the planting period and previous season which positively affect non-
farm labor. Damaged to other crops in the planting period have the largest coefficients 
in terms of magnitudes among all the shocks considered in the non-farm labor 
allocation model. The positive coefficient of negative health events experienced 
during the planting period is consistent with its negative effect on preharvest period 
on-farm labor. 
 The yield risk faced by the household in the preharvest period (ex post yield 
risk) has a positive but insignificant effect on preharvest non-farm labor allocation 
(Table 6.7). The effect of ex post yield risk on non-farm labor (0.042 days/acre) as 
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opposed to on-farm labor (-0.21) weakly supports the assumption of risk averse 
behavior of farmers. This result suggests that the household regards participation in 
the labor market as less risky than crop production and therefore increases their non-
farm labor allocation in response to an increase in ex post yield risk. This finding is 
consistent with the results of the planting period where yield risk has the same effect. 
 The statistical insignificance of the effect of idiosyncratic shocks and ex post 
yield risk on preharvest period labor allocation is consistence with the finding for the 
planting period. This confirms that households indeed have alternative measures for 
managing shocks and yield risk which does not involve labor allocation (both on-farm 
and non-farm).   
 Seasonality is important for both on-farm and non-farm labor allocation in the 
preharvest period. For on-farm labor allocation, the coefficient for season 1 is positive 
and significantly different from zero at 10% level. This finding is difficult to interpret 
since seasonality encompasses many characteristics including prices, access to 
important services, weather and events that can influence labor allocations. The village 
dummy variables considered in the model do not have significant effects on on-farm 
labor. For non-farm labor allocation, season 2 has a significant effect at the 1% level. 
Season 2 has a positive coefficient of 10.82 days per acre. Season 2 is the minor rainy 
season and therefore the household increases its participation in income-generating 
activities other than maize cultivation. For season 2, the household expects lower 
maize yields compared to season 1 and season 3; hence they decrease the attention 
they give to maize production. 
 In general, planting and preharvest period exogenous incomes do not play a 
significant role in explaining household on-farm labor decisions in the preharvest 
period. The coefficients for these variables are very low in magnitude. Planting and 
preharvest period exogenous incomes and their squares do not significantly affect on-
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farm labor allocation. The marginal effects of planting and preharvest period 
exogenous income at the mean of the sample are both positive, respectively. Based on 
the positive coefficient for the square of planting period exogenous income in the on-
farm labor allocation model (Table 6.7), households with high levels of planting 
period exogenous incomes greater than a certain critical value have marginal effects 
estimates for planting period exogenous income which are positive. Similarly, the 
marginal estimates for preharvest period exogenous income become negative at high 
levels of preharvest period exogenous income. The marginal effects of planting and 
preharvest period exogenous income are positive at the mean of the sample.  
 
Table 6.8—Estimated Marginal Effects and Elasticities of Selected Variables on Ex 
Post Labor Allocation 
  Marginal Effects Elasticities 
Variable On-farm Non-farm On-farm Non-farm 
Predicted planting period on-farm labor 1.20 0.23 0.09 0.02 
Predicted planting period non-farm labor 0.35 -0.02 0.03 0.00 
Percentage of acreage in maize -0.93 1.55 -0.01 0.01 
Planting period income × 1,000 (¢) 0.14 0.00 0.69 0.00 
Preharvest period income × 1,000,000 (¢) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Initial household wealth × 1,000 (¢) 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
 To analyze and clarify the effect of initial household wealth on labor allocation 
in the preharvest period, I use the estimates of marginal effects in Table 6.8 and joint 
tests of hypotheses. Initial wealth significantly influences on-farm labor allocation at 
the 1% level while its square insignificantly influences on-farm labor allocation. The 
marginal effect of initial wealth at the mean is positive but very low. A test of the joint 
significance of initial wealth and its square is performed; the p-value of Wald test35
                                                 
35 Refer to section G.2.12 of Appendix G for details of the results. 
 
statistic is 0.08 and therefore initial wealth and its quadratic term are significant at the 
10% level. The square of initial wealth has a positive coefficient. Therefore at low 
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wealth levels, initial household wealth has a negative effect on on-farm labor 
allocation. The negative marginal effect of initial wealth on on-farm labor at low 
levels of initial might be as a result of poor households reducing their exposure to 
yield risk thereby protecting their wealth. Initial wealth and its square do not have 
significant influence on non-farm labor. The estimated marginal effect of initial wealth 
on non-farm labor is very close to zero at the mean. A Wald test of the joint 
significance resulted in a p-value of 0.46. Therefore, I fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that initial household wealth and its square jointly influence preharvest period non-
farm labor allocation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Conclusions 
There have been numerous studies examining the role of shocks in household 
production decisions. However, most of theses studies have focused on covariate 
shocks at the expense of idiosyncratic shocks. In this thesis, I explore the role of 
idiosyncratic shocks and risk on smallholder labor allocation decisions using a two 
period expected utility model. Labor allocation is analyzed taking into account the 
sequential/dynamic nature of crop production from an ex ante and ex post perspective. 
Using a Just-Pope framework, I estimate the effect of idiosyncratic shocks on yield 
and conditional yield variance. The data were obtained from a panel study conducted 
from November 1996 to August 1998 in southern Ghana.36
 The marginal physical product of planting period labor is greater (but not 
significantly) than that of the preharvest period. The elasticities of planting and 
preharvest period labor are between 0 and 1 which indicates maize production is 
taking place in stage 2. Hence, households have the ability to allocate labor optimally. 
This may be tendered as evidence that households know how to grow maize properly 
to an extent. The occupation of the household head has a positive effect on maize 
yields; households with heads who are farmers enjoy higher maize yields as compared 
to households whose heads are not. The initial wealth of the household does not have 
an important effect on yield and has an estimated positive marginal physical product 
which is minute compared to mean household maize yield. Therefore ceteris paribus 
richer households do not necessarily obtain higher maize yields than poorer ones. In 
  
                                                 
36 Refer to A.1 of Appendix A for source and description of data. 
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assessing the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on maize yield, it is important to consider 
the type and timing of shocks.  The occurrence of unexpected expenses and damage to 
stored crops in the planting period has a prominent negative effect on maize yields. 
From the above discussions, it is evident that idiosyncratic shocks decrease the 
productivity of labor allocated to maize production by the household. 
  The results in this thesis strongly suggest that among all the idiosyncratic 
shocks considered only negative health events in the previous season contribute to the 
riskiness of maize yields. Therefore, the main sources of yield risk are planting period 
on-farm labor allocation, village effects, seasonality and negative health events from 
the previous season which are all risk-increasing. Planting and preharvest period on-
farm labor have a negative interaction and their marginal effect is positive (at the 
mean of the sample). According to the estimate of the elasticity of planting period on-
farm labor, yield risk is inelastic to changes in planting period on-farm labor 
allocation. Another source of yield risk is initial household wealth but the marginal 
risk effect estimate of initial wealth is very small. The effect of initial wealth on risk is 
concave and inelastic; therefore only household’s with extremely high wealth values 
can benefit from the risk-decreasing effect of wealth.  
 The effects of idiosyncratic shocks on labor allocations are analyzed using an 
ex ante and ex post labor allocation model. In the planting period, seasonal effects 
help explain both on-farm and non-farm labor allocation. Ex post on-farm labor 
allocation is positively influenced by on-farm and non-farm labor allocation during the 
planting period; estimates of their marginal effects is positive (Table 6.8). Thus the 
household considers planting period labor allocation when making on-farm allocation 
decisions in the preharvest period. The positive marginal effect of planting period on-
farm labor allocation means the household treats planting period on-farm labor 
allocation and preharvest period on-farm labor allocation as compliments. The 
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household also considers planting period non-farm labor allocation when making ex 
post on-farm labor allocation. None of the idiosyncratic shocks considered for the 
preharvest period have a significant influence on ex post on-farm labor allocation. 
They all have negative effects except for negative health events in the previous season 
which has a positive effect. Initial wealth has a very small marginal effect on ex post 
on-farm labor allocation. As a result, it does not play a significant role in household 
on-farm labor allocation behavior in the preharvest period.  
 Planting period on-farm and idiosyncratic shocks do not help explain ex post 
non-farm labor allocation. This is probably because planting period labor allocation is 
not factored into decision making about ex post non-farm labor allocation. Similar to 
on-farm labor allocation, none of the idiosyncratic shocks considered for the 
preharvest period are important variables for explaining ex post non-farm labor 
allocation. They all negatively influence ex post non-farm labor allocation except for 
negative health events. The marginal effect of initial wealth on ex post non-farm labor 
allocation at the sample mean is negative but very close to zero. As in the planting 
period, there is evidence of seasonal effects on ex post non-farm labor allocation. 
 For both the planting and preharvest periods, the negative effect of yield risk 
on on-farm labor allocation and its positive effect on non-farm labor allocation is 
partially in support of the assumption of household aversion to risk. Idiosyncratic 
shocks do not have a clear effect on yield risk and labor allocation; however, damage 
to stored crops and unexpected expenses in the planting period have strong effects on 
mean plot-level yields. This suggests the adoption of reasonably effective mechanisms 
that sufficiently cushion household against the negative effects of idiosyncratic 
shocks. Therefore households do not drastically change their labor allocation patterns 
in response to shocks and yield risk. This is consistent with qualitative findings based 
on discussions I had with Akwapim farmers in summer 2009. The significant negative 
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effects of damage to stored crops and unexpected expenses in the planting period 
indicates that mechanisms adopted by households for managing idiosyncratic shocks 
are not effective for shocks that decrease the cash budget of the household. 
 Initial household wealth does not significantly influence estimated mean yields 
but is strongly associated with increased yield risk and is negatively but weakly 
associated with labor allocation per acre. Hence wealthier households contrary to 
expectation do not choose higher risk/higher return maize production technology. This 
is probably because wealthier farmers are able to engage in activities that distract them 
from maize production leading to higher yield risk. This finding is not consistent with 
a self-insurance hypothesis. 
 
 
7.2 Summary of Contributions 
In this thesis, I use a two period expected utility model to analyze labor allocation 
taking into account both the incidence of shocks and the dynamic nature of 
agricultural production while incorporating a measure of risk faced by the household. 
Therefore, I examine the impact of idiosyncratic shocks already experienced by the 
household and yield risk perception during the season on labor allocation. The 
household’s yield risk perception is examined by introducing the concept of ex ante 
and ex post yield risk (Holt et al., 1992; Sandmo, 1970) into the analysis of on-farm 
labor allocation. 
 Past studies have used estimates for analyzing the effect of idiosyncratic 
shocks on household labor allocation behavior (e.g. Kochar, 1994). In this thesis, I use 
direct measures of household-specific idiosyncratic shocks. Households are asked 
directly about idiosyncratic shocks. 
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7.3 Recommendations 
In spite of the drastic negative effect of certain types of idiosyncratic shocks on maize 
yield, households ex ante and ex post on-farm labor allocation do not respond to them 
in terms of their on-farm labor allocation. Idiosyncratic shocks are only important for 
ex post non-farm labor allocation. The estimated marginal physical product for 
planting period labor is greater than zero. Thus on-farm labor is below the yield 
maximizing level. They also sacrifice the risk-decreasing effect resulting from the 
negative interaction between planting and preharvest period on-farm labor allocation. 
The role played by wealth in explaining household production decisions is at best 
marginal as it has a very small effect on productivity, labor allocation and yield risk. 
However, seasonal and village effects have strong effects. Households with heads who 
are farmers enjoy higher yields compared to those whose heads are not.  
 The above discussions have implications for designing policies to help rural 
households in Akwapim South cope with the occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks and 
their concomitant risk. Therefore policy-makers should focus on designing extension 
programs to help farm households improve their labor productivity without necessarily 
making crop production riskier.  The effects of location and time on labor productivity 
should also be taken into account. As evidenced by the results, maize production in 
Darmang is riskier than in the other three villages; however, maize yields in Darmang 
are higher than the other villages.  
 Based on the findings of this thesis, I also recommend that further research be 
carried out into understanding mechanisms smallholder farm households use for 
managing idiosyncratic shocks and yield risk. Households do not radically change 
their labor allocation patterns in response to the incidence of idiosyncratic shocks and 
yield risk.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
SURVEY AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
 
A.1 Data Collection 
Data were collected from four villages in southern Ghana—Darmang, Pokrom, 
Konkonuru and Oboadaka—from November 1996 to August 1998. The survey was 
conducted by Christopher Udry of the Department of Economics, Yale University and 
Markus Goldstein of the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
University of California, Berkeley. The data can be found at Christopher Udry’s 
website: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2//ghanadata.html 
Round: This refers to a data collection period. Respondents are asked questions about 
events that occurred over a given period e.g., past x months. For example, “how many 
bags of maize did you harvest over the last 2 months?” Below is the schedule for the 
interviews: 
 Round 1:11/25/1996 
 Round 2:1/27/1997 
 Round 3:3/3/1997 
 Round 4:4/14/1997 
 Round 5:6/2/1997 
 Round 6:7/7/1997 
 Round 7:8/18/1997 
 Round 8:9/29/1997 
 Round 9:12/2/1997 
 Round 10:1/20/1998 
 Round 11:3/16/1998 
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 Round 12:4/27/1998 
 Round 13:5/25/1998 
 Round 14:6/29/1998 
 Round 15:8/3/1998 
In round 1, respondents answered questions about household membership. In round 2 
questions were asked about events that occurred between the current interview 
(1/27/1997) and the last interview (11/25/1996). The same pattern was repeated for the 
remaining rounds. 
 
 
 
A.2 Variable Description 
Season: There are approximately 2 maize seasons in a single year. This variable refers 
to the season in which an activity took place. 
SEASON1 (planting period): March 1997 
SEASON1 (preharvest period): April to June 1997 
SEASON2 (planting period): August 1997 
SEASON2 (preharvest period): September to December 1997 
SEASON3 (planting period): March 1998  
SEASON3 (preharvest period): April to June 1998 
This is to some extent similar to the major and minor maize seasons in Akwapim 
South. I learned this during my face-to-face interviews with farmers. 
Village 1: This is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 if the household of the 
respondent is located in Darmang and 0 if otherwise.         
Village 2: This is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 if the household of the 
respondent is located in Pokrom and 0 if otherwise.                             
 86 
 
Village 3: This is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 if the household of the 
respondent is located in Oboadaka and 0 if otherwise.                              
Village 4: This is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 if the household of the 
respondent is located in Konkonuru and 0 if otherwise.     
Damage to stored crop in previous preharvest and harvest period: this refers to 
damage to crops in storage experienced by the household in the preharvest and harvest 
period of the previous season. It is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the 
household experienced this type of shock and 0 if otherwise. 
Damage to stored crops in planting: this refers to damage to crops in storage 
experienced by the household in the planting period of the current season. It is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the household experienced this type of 
shock and 0 if otherwise. 
Negative health events in previous preharvest and harvest period: this refers to 
negative health events experience by member(s) of the household in the planting 
period of the previous season. It is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the 
household experienced this type of shock and 0 if otherwise. 
Negative health events in planting period: this refers to negative health events 
experienced by member(s) of the household in the planting period of the planting 
season. It is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the household experienced 
this type of shock and 0 if otherwise. 
Unexpected expenses in preharvest and harvest period: this refers to unexpected 
expenses experienced by members of the household in the preharvest and harvest 
periods of the previous season. Examples of unexpected expenses are funeral 
expenses, increase in cost of farming tools and breakdown of productive assets. It is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if this type of shock is experienced by the 
household and 0 if otherwise. 
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Unexpected expenses in planting period: this refers to unexpected expenses 
experienced by members of the household in the planting period of the previous 
season. Examples of unexpected expenses are funeral expenses, and breakdown of 
productive assets. It is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if this type of shock 
is experienced by the household and 0 if otherwise. 
Initial wealth (¢): this is the wealth of the household in 1997/98 Ghanaian currency37 
at the beginning of the season or before the planting period begins. Wealth is defined 
as the sum of the value of food and farm output in storage, planting materials, farm 
equipment, other durable goods, livestock, jewelry, cloth, tradable goods, foreign 
exchange, amount spent on buildings, susufunds,38
Age: this variable refers to the age in years of the household head. 
 and bank balances net of loans 
given to and received from external sources.  
Education: this is a dummy variable which take a value of 1 if the household has had 
some schooling and 0 if otherwise. 
Planting period exogenous income (¢): this refers to income in1997/98 Ghanaian 
currency earned by the household from sources other than maize during the planting 
period of the season. This is the total value of sales for crops other than maize (value#) 
for the planting period of each season. For example, the planting period exogenous 
income for season 1 is given by the sum of the value of sales for round 3 and 4. I used 
non-maize income to represent exogenous income because most household did not 
report other sources of income. 
 
 
                                                 
37 The Ghanaian currency was redenominated in 2007; this constituted the removal of four zeros.  
38 A susufund is a savings fund managed by individuals called susu collectors. Susu collectors manage 
funds for several people. They visit their clients to collect fixed amounts at regular time intervals e.g. 
weekly, biweekly and monthly. This system is entirely based on trust and clients do not earn interest.  
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Preharvest period exogenous income (¢): this refers to income in1997/98 Ghanaian 
currency earned by the household from sources other than maize during the preharvest 
period of the season. This is the total value of sales for crops other than maize (value#) 
for the preharvest period of each season. For example, the planting period exogenous 
income for season 1 is given by the sum of the value of sales for round 5, 6 and 7. I 
used non-maize income to represent exogenous income because most household did 
not report other sources of income. 
Percentage of acreage in maize: this is the percentage of total household acreage 
occupied by maize. This the sum of all household maize acreage (acre) divided by 
total household acreage (totacre) for the current period. 
Acre: this is the household’s maize acreage. 
Planting period labor (days/acre): this is the number of days of labor allocated per 
acre by the household during the planting period of the current season. For example, 
the planting period labor for season 1 is given by the sum of the number of days of 
labor allocated during round 3 (days_lab3).  
Preharvest period (days/acre): this is the number of days of labor allocated per acre 
by the household during the preharvest period of the current season. For example, the 
preharvest period labor for season 1 is given by the sum of the number of days of labor 
allocated by the household during round 4 (days_lab4) and 5 (days_lab5).  
Planting period non-farm labor (days/acre): this is the number of days of labor 
allocated to activities other than maize cultivation by the household during the 
planting period of the current season. This consists of the sum of days of labor 
allocated to other businesses (hhlab_nf1) and number of days worked by head and 
spouse (totdays) for other people.  
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Preharvest period non-farm labor (days/acre): this is the number of days of labor 
allocated to activities other than maize cultivation by the household during the 
preharvest period of the current season. This consists of the sum of days of labor 
allocated to other businesses (hhlab_nf2) and number of days worked by head and 
spouse (totdays2) for other people.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PLOTS 
 
Table B.1—Descriptive Statistics for Important Variables 
 
Variable Mean SD       
Plot Level Characteristics     
Maize yield (kg/acre) 75.3 103.61 
Planting labor (days/acre) 5.9 12.33 
Preharvest labor (days/acre) 12.6 17.01 
Acreage 5.1 7.19 
Percentage of acreage in maize 0.7 0.36 
Plot Level Shocks   
Damage to maize in  previous harvest and preharvest  period  0.00  
Damage to maize in  planting  period  1.12  
Damage to other crops in  previous harvest and preharvest  period  1.12  
Damage to other crops in planting  period  7.43  
Household Level Shocks     
Damage to stored crop in previous harvest and preharvest period 0.96  
Damage to stored crop in planting period 6.73  
Negative health events in previous preharvest and harvest period 18.75  
Negative health event in previous planting period 31.25  
Unexpected expenses in previous harvest and preharvest period 0  
Unexpected expenses in planting period 12.98  
Village Dummies (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)     
Darmang 34.6  
Pokrom 6.7  
Oboadaka 40.2  
Konkonuru 18.6  
Season Dummies  (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)     
Season 1 (March 96 to July 97) 52.4  
Season 2 (August 97 to January 98) 27.9  
Season 3 (March 98 to July 98) 19.7  
Household Characteristics     
Initial wealth 1690000 2920000 
Occupation of household head 88.9  
Age of household head 43.4 13.31 
Education status of household head 86.6  
Planting period non-farm labor (days) 7.5 19.22 
Preharvest period non-farm labor (days) 6.8 16.38 
Planting period farm income (¢) 371000 1190000 
Preharvest period farm income (¢) 222000 603000 
Expected preharvest farm income (¢) 441000 1520000 
Estimated Risk Measures (standard deviation)     
SD of maize yield in planting period 17.14 6.25 
SD of maize yield in preharvest period 14.65 5.53 
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Table B.2—Descriptive Statistics for Important Variables 
  Coefficient of Variation (%) 
Variable Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 
Maize yield (kg/acre) 147.94 74.16 106.97 
Planting labor (days/acre) 204.44 169.97 102.02 
Preharvest labor (days/acre) 117.15 120.33 145.00 
Acreage 143.01 142.66 102.02 
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Figure B.1—Quantity of Maize Harvested by Round 
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Figure B.2—On-farm Labor Allocation by Round 
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Figure B.3—Distribution of Household Acreage 
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Figure B.4—Distribution of Household Acreage in Maize 
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Figure B.5—Distribution of Initial Household Wealth  
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
DIAGNOSTIC PLOTS OF RESIDUALS AGAINST LABOR 
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Figure C.1—Household Labor Allocation in Planting Period 
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Figure C.2—Household Labor Allocation in Preharvest Period 
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APPENDIX D 
 
HETEROSCEDASTICITY CORRECTION 
 
D.1 Iterative Procedure for Heteroscedasticity Correction  
The purpose of the iteration is to obtain correct standard errors for the parameters of 
the yield function. The iterative regression constitutes the following steps: 
1. Maize yield is regressed on on-farm inputs and relevant household covariates. 
The standard errors of the coefficients are saved. 
2. Residuals predicted from the first regression are squared. 
3. The squared residuals are regressed on on-farm inputs and linear predictions 
are generated. 
4. The square root of the absolute value of the linear predictions is taken. This is 
used to correct for heteroscedasticity by dividing all the variables of the 
regression (both dependent and independent) by it. The new set of variables is 
used to update the old ones. 
5. A regression using the corrected variables in step 4 is performed. The standard 
errors of the coefficients are saved. 
6. The standard errors of the coefficients of the regression in step 5 are compared 
to those of the regression in step 1. If the magnitude of the difference is greater 
than 0.05, steps 1-5 are repeated. The steps are repeated until the magnitude of 
the difference is less than 0.05 which suggest convergence of the standard 
errors.   
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The iterative correction procedure is further illustrated in the equations below. 
Consider a regression equation with heteroscedasticity: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )iiiiii xhxhxxhxhy εββ ++= 0  
The variance of random errors ( )iii xhu ε=   can be expressed as: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )iiiii xhxhExhVar 22 σεε ==  
In a weighted least square regression, where the source of heteroscedasticity is known, 
we can estimate ( )ixh  using an approximation ( )in xhˆ  which denotes the nth estimation 
of ( )ixh . 
Therefore, if ( ) ( )ii xhxh ≈1ˆ  
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From the above shows that we can solve the problem of heteroscedasticity by 
repeating WLS until the estimated variance of error terms ( )iii xhu ε=  converges.  
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D.2 Iterative Heteroscedasticity Correction 
Table D.1—Final Regression for Iterative Heteroscedasticity Correction 
Variables Random Effects Fixed Effects 
   
Planting period labor 0.191** 0.245 
 (0.0819) (0.360) 
Square of planting period labor -0.00392* -0.00927 
 (0.00209) (0.00808) 
Preharvest period labor 0.0324 1.008* 
 (0.0400) (0.498) 
Square of preharvest period labor -0.000713 -0.0257** 
 (0.000659) (0.0120) 
     Planting labor × preharvest labor 0.00337  
 (0.00300)  
Village and Seasonal Dummies   
Darmang  4.898*  
 (2.615)  
Pokrom -0.988  
 (0.971)  
Oboadaka 0.166  
 (0.617)  
Season 1 (March 96 to July 97) -7.692** 6.645 
 (3.649) (5.326) 
Season 2 (August 97 to January 98) -9.077** 2.902 
 (3.839) (4.874) 
Idiosyncratic Shocks (Dummy Variables)   
Damage to stored crop in previous harvest and preharvest  -10.31** 8.871 
 (4.534) (13.13) 
Damage to stored crop in planting period -0.120 9.711 
 (1.030) (7.253) 
Negative health events in previous harvest and preharvest 
period 
-0.327 1.802 
 (0.506) (3.327) 
Negative health events in planting period -0.566 -6.932* 
 (0.591) (3.594) 
Unexpected expenses in planting period 1.009 -1.765 
 (1.417) (5.501) 
Household Characteristics   
Occupation (1 if household head is farmer, 0 if otherwise) -0.190  
 (2.813)  
Education (1 if household head had some schooling, 0 if 
otherwise) 
0.0206  
 (0.441)  
Age of household head 0.305  
 (0.188)  
Square of age of household head -0.00338*  
 (0.00188)  
Initial wealth 9.73e-07 -2.13e-06 
 (8.17e-07) (2.11e-06) 
Square of initial wealth × 1000 -4.96e-11 1.61e-10 
 (3.79e-11) (1.99e-10) 
Constant 0.579* -0.225 
 (0.318) (0.540) 
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Table D.1 (Continued)   
 Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Observations 269 269 
R-squared  0.332 
Number of pid 238 238 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
 
ESTIMATION OF EX ANTE AND EX POST YIELD RISK 
 
Ex ante and ex post yield risk are estimated using pooled seasonal observations in 
order to take advantage of identification resulting from inter-seasonal, intra-household, 
plot-level, and cross-sectional variations among maize plots. Using a Just-Pope 
specification, we can estimate the season-plot-specific yield risk faced by each 
household. However, due to the simultaneity between on-farm labor allocation and 
yield risk, and the fact that yield risk is not observed by the household, yield risk is 
estimated using initial household wealth, past idiosyncratic shocks, household, 
seasonal, and village characteristics. Ex ante and ex post yield risk are estimated 
similarly with the only difference been in terms of idiosyncratic shocks already 
experienced by the household. Referring to (33) and (34), the only difference is 
idiosyncratic shocks ( )1s experienced by the household in the planting period of the 
current season.  
            I assume that the first two moments of yield are functions of initial household 
wealth, past idiosyncratic shocks, household, seasonal, and village characteristics. 
Using the Just-Pope method described in section 5.2, ex ante yield risk can be 
estimated sequentially in the following steps: 
1. I estimate the yield function by regressing yield on initial household wealth, 
past idiosyncratic shocks, household, seasonal, and village characteristics (see 
Table E.1).  
2. I use the estimates from the regression in step 1 to generate residuals. Each plot 
will have a different residual. 
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3. I regress the square of the residuals on all the independent variables used in 
step 1 (see Table E.3).  
4. I use the estimates of the regression in step 2 to generate linear predictions. 
These linear predictions represent the ex ante yield risk faced by the household 
for each plot. 
The above steps are repeated for estimating ex post yield risk with an additional 
independent variable 1s . Therefore, the household determine ex post yield risk by 
updating its knowledge of ex ante yield risk. 
 
Table E.1—Estimation of Household Expected Yield in the Planting Period 
 
Variables 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village and Seasonal Dummies   
Darmang  -39.84*  
 (20.59)  
Pokrom -46.31  
 (30.63)  
Oboadaka 0.116  
 (19.22)  
Season 1 (March 96 to July 97) 14.34 20.84 
 (11.47) (15.22) 
Season 2 (August 97 to January 98) 1.371 9.316 
 (13.92) (18.12) 
Negative health events in previous harvest and preharvest period 11.16 -9.581 
 (12.32) (15.69) 
Household Characteristics   
Occupation (1 if head is farmer, 0 if otherwise) -24.00  
 (23.45)  
Education (1 if head had some schooling, 0 if otherwise) 14.78  
 (24.85)  
Age of household head -5.221  
 (3.751)  
Square of age of household head 0.0418  
 (0.0392)  
Initial wealth 1.47e-05*** -9.09e-06 
 (5.63e-06) (1.54e-05) 
Square of initial wealth × 1000 -6.71e-10** 7.68e-10 
 (3.20e-10) (1.24e-09) 
Constant 217.7** 70.17*** 
 (88.40) (20.36) 
Observations 269 269 
R-squared  0.138 
Number of pid 238 238 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E.2—Estimation of Household Expected Yield in the Preharvest Period 
 
Variables 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village and Seasonal Dummies   
Darmang  -40.66**  
 (20.68)  
Pokrom -56.46*  
 (31.00)  
Oboadaka -4.675  
 (19.52)  
Season 1 (March 96 to July 97) -11.51 -15.76 
 (16.62) (21.76) 
Season 2 (August 97 to January 98) -24.56 -23.90 
 (18.25) (23.21) 
Idiosyncratic Shocks (Dummy Variables)   
Damage to stored crops in planting period 14.01 -9.448 
 (29.13) (58.64) 
Damage to other crops in planting period  -8.216 0.246 
 (18.63) (27.85) 
Negative health events in previous preharvest and harvest period 14.80 1.572 
 (12.09) (16.14) 
Negative health events in planting period 4.897 -4.205 
 (11.16) (15.65) 
Unexpected expenses in planting period -56.47*** -80.02** 
 (21.06) (31.56) 
Household Characteristics   
Occupation (1 if head is farmer, 0 if otherwise) -23.12  
 (23.74)  
Education (1 if head had some schooling, 0 if otherwise) 19.56  
 (25.30)  
Age of household head -5.126  
 (3.782)  
Square of age of household head 0.0401  
 (0.0395)  
Initial wealth 1.67e-05*** -2.56e-06 
 (5.81e-06) (1.66e-05) 
Square of initial wealth × 1000 -8.19e-10** 4.51e-10 
 (3.29e-10) (1.24e-09) 
Constant 238.5*** 100.1*** 
 (89.22) (24.88) 
   
Observations 269 269 
R-squared  0.378 
Number of pid 238 238 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E.3—Estimation of Household Conditional Yield Variance for Planting Period 
 
Variables 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village and Seasonal Dummies   
Darmang  106.5  
 (176.1)  
Pokrom -191.0*  
 (105.1)  
Oboadaka -7.056  
 (108.9)  
Season 1 (March 96 to July 97) 18.53 -78.31 
 (116.9) (78.02) 
Season 2 (August 97 to January 98) -205.0 -326.0 
 (139.5) (307.2) 
Negative health events in previous harvest and preharvest period 215.0 56.67 
 (207.0) (85.62) 
Household Characteristics   
Occupation (1 if head is farmer, 0 if otherwise) 102.0  
 (189.0)  
Education (1 if head had some schooling, 0 if otherwise) 107.2  
 (136.4)  
Age of household head -44.30  
 (30.71)  
Square of age of household head 0.376  
 (0.294)  
Initial wealth 0.000145*** 1.13e-05 
 (5.25e-05) (6.54e-05) 
Square of initial wealth × 1000 -7.59e-09*** -6.46e-10 
 (2.63e-09) (4.86e-09) 
Constant 1105 242.8* 
 (747.0) (134.8) 
   
Observations 269 269 
R-squared  0.075 
Number of pid 238 238 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E.4—Estimation of Household Conditional Yield Variance for Preharvest 
Period 
 
Variables 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Village and Seasonal Dummies   
Darmang  77.85  
 (136.9)  
Pokrom -157.5*  
 (81.19)  
Oboadaka 6.186  
 (80.22)  
Season 1 (March 96 to July 97) -9.927 147.1 
 (86.02) (140.9) 
Season 2 (August 97 to January 98) -185.1 36.35 
 (120.2) (62.68) 
Idiosyncratic Shocks (Dummy Variables)   
Damage to stored crops in planting period -36.88 397.9 
 (105.7) (364.3) 
Damage to other crops in planting period  -46.03 170.2 
 (101.5) (170.8) 
Negative health events in previous preharvest and harvest period 216.4 99.10 
 (147.7) (104.1) 
Negative health events in planting period 69.30 -217.5 
 (114.3) (197.3) 
Unexpected expenses in planting period -108.5 70.72 
 (132.5) (114.4) 
Household Characteristics   
Occupation (1 if head is farmer, 0 if otherwise) 103.7  
 (141.1)  
Education (1 if head had some schooling, 0 if otherwise) 69.75  
 (90.62)  
Age of household head -36.26  
 (26.02)  
Square of age of household head 0.309  
 (0.263)  
Initial wealth 9.35e-05*** -0.000159 
 (3.09e-05) (0.000150) 
Square of initial wealth × 1000 -4.91e-09*** 1.08e-08 
 (1.56e-09) (1.02e-08) 
Constant 908.8 151.3* 
 (604.6) (78.14) 
   
Observations 269 269 
R-squared  0.156 
Number of pid 238 238 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 104 
 
APPENDIX F 
 
 
PRODUCTIVITY AND RISK EFFECT ESTIMATES 
 
F.1 Marginal Physical Products and Elasticities of Labor and Wealth  
The household maize yield function is written as: 
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F.2 Marginal Risk Effect for Selected Variables 
The conditional yield variance function is written as: 
( ) ++++⋅+++++= 0820706215224213221102 sWWllllllyV ffffff ααααααααα  
εηα ++ Xs09  
Therefore the marginal risk effects of ,, 21 ff ll and 0W  can be expressed as: 
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F.3 Marginal Effect of Labor and Wealth on Labor Allocation  
Below are the household ex ante labor allocation decision rules: 
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Marginal risk effects of exogenous income and initial wealth on ex ante labor 
allocation can be expressed as: 
175
1
1 2 I
I
l f ωω +=
∂
∂
  032
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1 2 W
W
l f ωω +=
∂
∂
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∂
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Below are the household ex post labor allocation decision rules: 
222
210
2
19281726
2
05041302102
lf
it
lf
if HIIIIVWWssll εµχγγγγγγγγγγγ +++++++++++++=  
222
210
2
19281726
2
05041302102
lw
it
lw
iw HIIIIVWWssll εµϕψψψψψψψψψψψ +++++++++++++=  
Marginal risk effects of exogenous income and initial wealth on ex post labor 
allocation can be expressed as: 
197
1
2 2 I
I
l f γγ +=
∂
∂
  2108
2
2 2 I
I
l f γγ +=
∂
∂
  054
0
2 2 W
W
l f γγ +=
∂
∂
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1
2 2 I
I
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∂
∂
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2
2 2 I
I
lw ψψ +=
∂
∂
  054
0
2 2 W
W
lw ψψ +=
∂
∂  
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APPENDIX G 
 
TEST OF HYPOTHESES 
G.1 Hausman’s Specification Test  
G.1.1 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0721
                          =        6.99
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
initwealth~q      7.68e-10    -6.71e-10        1.44e-09        1.20e-09
  initwealth     -9.09e-06     .0000147       -.0000238        .0000144
daysmiss_p~g     -9.580925     11.16098       -20.74191        9.704839
     season2      9.316108     1.371225        7.944883         11.5965
     season1      20.83977     14.34064        6.499133        9.995476
                                                                              
                   fixed1      random1       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
Comparison of Fixed and Random Effects Estimation of Household Expected 
Maize Yield in the Planting Period 
 
 
 
G.1.2 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1807
                          =       10.14
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
initwealth~q      4.51e-10    -8.19e-10        1.27e-09        1.19e-09
  initwealth     -2.56e-06     .0000167       -.0000192        .0000155
nex_prehar~t     -80.01682    -56.46845       -23.54837        23.51342
daysmiss_p~t     -4.205198     4.896981       -9.102179        10.96871
daysmiss_p~g       1.57196     14.80395       -13.23199        10.69736
damage_pre~2      .2456726    -8.216031        8.461704        20.70245
vals_preha~t     -9.448127     14.00723       -23.45536        50.88531
     season2      -23.8969    -24.56247        .6655676        14.32875
     season1     -15.76359    -11.51404       -4.249552        14.03507
                                                                              
                   fixed2      random2       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
Comparison of Fixed and Random Effects Estimation of Household Expected 
Maize Yield in the Preharvest Period 
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G.1.3 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1407
                          =       16.01
                 chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
initwealth~q     -5.08e-10    -8.18e-10        3.11e-10        5.26e-10
  initwealth      9.15e-06     .0000185       -9.35e-06        2.74e-06
     season2     -12.54446    -13.28607        .7416045        14.60906
     season1     -4.383934    -.0286047       -4.355329        15.31922
nex_prehar~t     -71.93232    -26.23361       -45.69872               .
daysmiss_p~t      5.573586     2.254179        3.319407        9.008727
daysmiss_p~g      5.896071     11.87595       -5.979879        7.794226
damage_pre~2      5.871413     22.99313       -17.12172        14.32484
vals_preha~t      .0324614    -33.35184         33.3843        36.16453
      lab1_2      .0704646    -.0569232        .1273878        .0615201
     lab2_sq      .0060481    -.0062718        .0123199        .0358767
 lab_preharv      -2.03695     2.763157       -4.800107        1.409793
     lab1_sq      .0460269     .0107998        .0352271        .0219045
   lab_plant     -.0017133     2.139634       -2.141347        1.094443
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
Comparison of Fixed and Random Effects Estimation of Household Maize 
Yield Function 
 
 
 
 
 
G.1.4 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.3535
                          =        6.66
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     season2      8.808049    -9.354348         18.1624        11.52584
     season1     -3.797646    -9.080425        5.282779        4.746456
 farminc1_sq     -2.15e-10     9.95e-11       -3.14e-10        1.32e-09
   farm_inc1      3.33e-06    -1.23e-06        4.56e-06        8.72e-06
initwealth~q      3.31e-10    -2.64e-11        3.57e-10        2.74e-10
  initwealth     -4.09e-06     7.62e-07       -4.85e-06        3.51e-06
         sd1      1.605289    -.5488995        2.154189        1.247114
daysmiss_p~g     -1.170472      .340719       -1.511191        2.695705
    polim_sq      31.81159     23.05887        8.752724        21.57333
       polim     -50.19986      -28.263       -21.93686        25.69042
                                                                              
                  fixedl1      randoml1      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
Comparison of Fixed and Random Effects Estimation of Planting Period On-
farm Labor Allocation Model 
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G.1.5 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0001
                          =       27.44
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     season2      6.207714    -3.669557        9.877271        4.934131
     season1     -.1212203    -6.929165        6.807945        2.305515
 farminc1_sq     -2.12e-09    -9.60e-10       -1.16e-09        8.45e-10
   farm_inc1      .0000145     7.36e-06        7.15e-06        5.49e-06
initwealth~q     -2.66e-11     1.72e-10       -1.98e-10        1.69e-10
  initwealth      1.84e-07    -7.82e-07        9.66e-07        2.01e-06
         sd1      1.120465     .6445816        .4758838        .4964482
daysmiss_p~g      1.755217    -.3740474        2.129264        .8887908
    polim_sq      -1.11537     28.92366       -30.03903        8.405274
       polim      3.962128    -33.25744        37.21957        9.574963
                                                                              
                  fixedn1      randomn1      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
Comparison of Fixed and Random Effects Estimation of Planting Period Non-
farm Labor Allocation Model 
 
 
 
G.1.6 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.8390
                          =        8.07
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
initwealth~q     -7.75e-11     6.51e-11       -1.43e-10        5.39e-10
  initwealth      1.23e-06    -1.30e-06        2.53e-06        8.27e-06
 farminc2_sq     -9.29e-11    -1.12e-12       -9.17e-11        1.37e-10
 farminc1_sq     -5.02e-09     1.93e-10       -5.21e-09        4.20e-09
   farm_inc2       .000017     2.05e-06         .000015        .0000659
   farm_inc1      .0000343    -8.85e-07        .0000352        .0000289
     season2     -7.598573     1.997478       -9.596051        13.70529
     season1     -5.357476     5.731146       -11.08862        17.49409
         sd2      -.366884    -.2100311       -.1568529        1.289249
nex_prehar~t       11.8066    -1.660445        13.46704        20.47531
daysmiss_p~t      1.503781    -.9649505        2.468731        6.294124
daysmiss_p~g     -4.153856     .8778626       -5.031719         8.50184
damage_pre~2     -8.149845    -1.847538       -6.302306        13.71326
vals_preha~t     -12.78117     -2.17332       -10.60785        27.60188
    polim_sq      1.702315     4.830507       -3.128192        10.95021
   nflab1_sq      -.154653    -.0000121       -.1546409        .1196277
     nflab_1     -.8172194     .3540227       -1.171242        2.206546
     labp_sq      .0195212    -.0102124        .0297336        .0618993
       lab_p     -.6078341     1.317695       -1.925529        1.997573
                                                                              
                  fixedl2      randoml2      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
Comparison of Fixed and Random Effects Estimation of Preharvest Period On-
farm Labor Allocation Model 
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G.1.7 
 
Comparison of Fixed and Random Effects Estimation of Preharvest Period 
Non-farm Labor Allocation Model 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.4248
                          =       13.30
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
initwealth~q     -1.09e-10    -2.29e-11       -8.59e-11        3.59e-10
  initwealth      5.64e-06     2.63e-07        5.38e-06        5.52e-06
 farminc2_sq     -2.83e-11     6.98e-13       -2.90e-11        9.19e-11
 farminc1_sq     -1.43e-09    -2.94e-11       -1.40e-09        2.81e-09
   farm_inc2      .0000212    -2.30e-06        .0000235         .000044
   farm_inc1      .0000149    -2.05e-07        .0000152        .0000193
     season2     -2.569792     10.82439       -13.39419        9.072312
     season1      -20.8547     .3388545       -21.19355        11.62943
         sd2      1.618487     .0423937        1.576093        .8585381
nex_prehar~t     -16.17403    -.7800573       -15.39398        13.63079
daysmiss_p~t      6.499822       .21489        6.284932        4.151958
daysmiss_p~g     -14.67611     1.320934       -15.99704        5.631993
damage_pre~2      7.801928    -3.293638        11.09557        9.100529
vals_preha~t     -34.92363    -1.110756       -33.81287        18.38528
    polim_sq     -6.552005     3.129078       -9.681083        5.583058
   nflab1_sq     -.0245124     .0000545       -.0245669        .0799534
     nflab_1      -.044825    -.0246797       -.0201453        1.474346
     labp_sq      .0855704    -.0018371        .0874075        .0413544
       lab_p     -2.765991     .2546033       -3.020595        1.332699
                                                                              
                  fixedn2      randomn2      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
 
 
 
 
 
 
G.2 Wald Tests of Significance 
 
G.2.1 
 
Test of Joint Significance of the Effect of Idiosyncratic Shocks on Maize Yield 
for Random Effects Model 
 
 
 
 
 
P r o b > c h i 2 = 0 . 3 2 1 6            
c h i 2 (    4 )   =      4 . 6 8 
(   4 )    d a y s m i s s _ p r e h a r v e s t   =   0 
(   3 )    d a y s m i s s _ p l a n t i n g   =   0 
(   2 )    d a m a g e _ p r e h a r v e s t 2   =   0 
(   1 )    v a l s _ p r e h a r v e s t   =   0 
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G.2.2 
 
Test of Joint Significance of the Effect of Initial Wealth Variables on Maize 
Yield for Random Effects Model 
 
 
 
 
 
G.2.3 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.4886
           chi2(  1) =    0.48
       Constraint 2 dropped
 ( 2)  initwealth_sq = 0
 ( 1)  initwealth = 0
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Initial Wealth Variables on 
Planting Period On-farm Labor allocation for Random Effects Model 
 
 
 
 
 
G.2.4 
            Prob > F =    0.9404
       F(  1,   236) =    0.01
       Constraint 2 dropped
 ( 2)  initwealth_sq = 0
 ( 1)  initwealth = 0
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Initial Wealth Variables on 
Planting Period Non-farm Labor allocation for Random Effects Model 
 
 
 
 
 
G.2.5 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
           chi2(  2) =   31.00
 ( 2)  labp_sq = 0
 ( 1)  lab_p = 0
Test of Joint Significance of Effect of Planting Period On-farm Labor 
Allocation on Preharvest Period On-farm Labor Allocation for Random Effects 
Model 
 
 
 
P r o b > c h i 2 = 0 . 1 8 8 9             
c h i 2 (    1 )   =      1 . 7 3 
        C o n s t r a i n t   2   d r o p p e d 
  (   2 )    i n i t w e a l t h _ s q   =   0 
  (   1 )    i n i t w e a l t h   =   0 
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G.2.6 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
           chi2(  2) =  869.58
 ( 2)  nflab1_sq = 0
 ( 1)  nflab_1 = 0
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Planting Period Non-farm Labor 
Allocation on Preharvest Period On-farm Labor Allocation for Random Effects 
Model 
 
 
 
 
G.2.7 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9315
           chi2(  5) =    1.33
 ( 5)  nex_preharvest = 0
 ( 4)  daysmiss_preharvest = 0
 ( 3)  daysmiss_planting = 0
 ( 2)  damage_preharvest2 = 0
 ( 1)  vals_preharvest = 0
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Idiosyncratic Shocks on 
Preharvest Period On-farm Labor Allocation for Random Effects Model 
 
 
 
G.2.8 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0796
           chi2(  1) =    3.07
       Constraint 2 dropped
 ( 2)  initwealth_sq = 0
 ( 1)  initwealth = 0
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Initial Wealth Variables on 
Preharvest Period On-farm Labor Allocation for Random Effects Model 
 
 
 
 
G.2.9 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.3633
           chi2(  2) =    2.03
 ( 2)  labp_sq = 0
 ( 1)  lab_p = 0
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Planting Period On-farm Labor 
Allocation on Preharvest Period Non-farm Labor Allocation for Random 
Effects Model 
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G.2.10 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.5757
           chi2(  2) =    1.10
 ( 2)  nflab1_sq = 0
 ( 1)  nflab_1 = 0
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Planting Period Non-farm Labor 
Allocation on Preharvest Period Non-farm Labor Allocation for Random 
Effects Model 
 
 
 
 
G.2.11 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.5490
           chi2(  5) =    4.00
 ( 5)  nex_preharvest = 0
 ( 4)  daysmiss_preharvest = 0
 ( 3)  daysmiss_planting = 0
 ( 2)  damage_preharvest2 = 0
 ( 1)  vals_preharvest = 0
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Idiosyncratic Shocks on 
Preharvest Period Non-farm Labor Allocation for Random Effects Model 
 
 
 
G.2.12 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.4598
           chi2(  1) =    0.55
       Constraint 2 dropped
 ( 2)  initwealth_sq = 0
 ( 1)  initwealth = 0
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Initial Wealth Variables on 
Preharvest Period Non-farm Labor Allocation for Random Effects Model 
 
 
 
G.2.13 
 
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Idiosyncratic Shocks on Yield 
Risk for White Correction 
            Prob > F =    0.7196
       F(  5,   247) =    0.57
 ( 5)  nex_preharvest = 0
 ( 4)  daysmiss_preharvest = 0
 ( 3)  daysmiss_planting = 0
 ( 2)  damage_preharvest2 = 0
 ( 1)  vals_preharvest = 0
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G.2.14 
            Prob > F =    0.4724
       F(  5,   247) =    0.91
 ( 5)  nex_preharvest = 0
 ( 4)  daysmiss_preharvest = 0
 ( 3)  daysmiss_planting = 0
 ( 2)  damage_preharvest2 = 0
 ( 1)  vals_preharvest = 0
Test of the Joint Significance of the Effect of Idiosyncratic Shocks on Yield 
Risk for Iterative Correction 
 
 
G.3 Breusch-Pagan’s Test of Heteroscedasticity 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(21)     =   733.07
Conditional Yield Variance Function  
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